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Abstract 
 
 
Contracts and exits from a sample of 179 investment rounds in 132 entrepreneurial firms 
by 17 European venture capital (VC) funds are analyzed.  The data indicate the financial contracts 
are quite heterogeneous in terms of both the cash flow and control rights.  The use of different 
securities by European VC funds does not depend on the definition of venture capital, and the 
securities used are not functional equivalents.  A normative empirical analysis of exit shows the 
likelihood of different types of exit vehicles (IPO, acquisition, and liquidation) and the returns to 
venture capital depend on not only firm specific characteristics but also the allocation of cash 
flow and control rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Venture capital1 contracts are heterogeneous: there exist differences across contracts in 
the selected securities, control rights, veto rights, provisions for different contingencies, among 
other things, depending on the characteristics of the transacting parties.  Venture capital exit 
decisions are also heterogeneous: a disposition may involve an initial public offering (IPO), or an 
acquisition (i.e., a trade sale, where both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist sell their interest), 
and venture capital contracts typically specify which party has control over the exit decision.2 
  
It is widely recognized that a venture capitalist’s decision to invest in an entrepreneurial 
firm is based on exit potential. While previous research in venture capital has identified 
international differences in financial contracts and international differences in exit strategies, the 
precise interaction between these two activities has not been empirically studied. This paper 
introduces a new European venture capital dataset to provide new insights into the ways in which 
contracting and exit are interrelated.  This paper provides a positive empirical analysis of the 
types of contracts used by venture capitalists, and a normative empirical analysis of the resulting 
exit process associated with different contracts and different types of entrepreneurial investments. 
 
In the first of the two main parts of this paper, a positive analysis of functional 
differences in financial contracts is provided.  We expand the scope of evidence on securities 
used in venture capital finance.  While venture capitalists in the United States almost always use 
convertible preferred equity to finance entrepreneurial firms, venture capitalists in every other 
country (at least those where data are available) use a variety of forms of finance (see section II 
below for details).   In the European venture capital data herein, we observe common equity used 
most frequently, but there are a wide variety of securities used in venture capital transactions.  We 
relate the use of different securities to the type of entrepreneurial firm (e.g., stage of development, 
industry), board seats, specific contingencies, veto rights and other control rights.  Previous 
research has not considered the allocation of control rights when securities other than convertible 
preferred equity are used. 
 
The second of the two main parts of this paper provides a normative analysis of the 
performance of the different investments – in terms of the selected exit vehicle (IPO, acquisition, 
write-off3) and the IRR.  This part of the analysis is based on previous research on venture capital 
exits (MacIntosh, 1997; Black and Gilson, 1998; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; 
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Schweinbacher, 2001; Smith, 2001; Fleming, 2002). We extend previous research by considering, 
among other things, how control rights and cash flow rights among different securities affects the 
selection of the exit vehicle.  Our data are the first European dataset that enables and investment-
by-investment analysis of the selected exit vehicle,4 and the first dataset (anywhere) that enables a 
normative analysis of which financial structure is ‘best’ in venture capital finance. 
 
This paper analyzes a hand-collected dataset involving 179 investment rounds in 132 
entrepreneurial firms from 17 European venture capital funds.  Coincidentally, the data are quite 
similar in scope to other hand-collected datasets in academic venture capital research.  For 
example, Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) analyze 213 investment rounds in 119 portfolio 
companies by 14 U.S. venture capital funds.  Papers by Gompers (1997) and Hellmann and Puri 
(2000, 2001) also use data of similar scope. 
 
In a nutshell, the data herein indicate the following.  First, different securities are not 
functional equivalents in venture capital contracts.  That contracts other than convertible 
preferred equity are used is not dependent on the definition of venture capital.  Second, the 
allocation of control rights, board seats, etc., depends on the allocation of cash flow rights 
through the use of different securities.  Third, the selected exit vehicle and the returns to venture 
capital significantly depend on the allocation of cash flow and control rights in specific venture 
capitalist investments.  The results are interpreted within the institutional context from which the 
data are derived, and suggest avenues for further theoretical and empirical research. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II outlines previous research.  The data are 
described in section III.  Section IV considers the determinants of contractual terms.  Section V 
evaluates the performance of the investments under different contracts, and the likelihood of 
different exit outcomes. Limitations are discussed in section VI, and avenues for future 
theoretical and empirical research are discussed.  Concluding remarks follow. 
 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Our research is based on a number of earlier papers that have provided the foundation for 
understanding venture capital (VC) investing and exit decisions.  Previous VC contracting and 
exit papers may be categorized into seven groups:5 
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(1) Empirical research based on U.S. data indicating the prevalent use of convertible 
preferred equity, staging, syndication, and various control rights, etc. (Sahlman, 
1990; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995, 1997; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002);  
 
(2) Theoretical research explaining the optimality of convertible preferred equity in 
venture capital based on the U.S. evidence, and the allocation of various control 
rights (Sahlman, 1990; Chan, et al., 1990; Berglöf, 1994; Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; 
Hellmann, 1998; Marx, 1998; Trester, 1998; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Repullo and 
Suarez, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001a; Kirilenko, 2001; Schmidt, 2001; among 
others); 
 
(3) Research indicating the role of U.S. tax law in biasing the selected security in the 
U.S. towards convertible preferred equity for U.S. entrepreneurial firms (Gilson and 
Schizer, 2001), but not in other jurisdictions such as Canada (Sandler, 2001); 
 
(4) Empirical research showing the use of a variety of different securities in jurisdictions 
other than the United States, including Canada (Cumming, 2000), Germany (Bascha 
and Walz, 2001b), Finland (Parhankangas and Smith, 2000), Taiwan (Songtao, 
2000), Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000), as well as in cases of cross-
border U.S. VC investments in Canadian entrepreneurial firms (Cumming, 2001), 
and for different types of venture capital funds (not only limited partnerships, but 
also corporate VCs, government VCs, etc.; Cumming, 2000);6 
 
(5) Theoretical research on the optimality of convertible preferred equity in ensuring an 
efficient exit (Berglöf, 1994; Black and Gilson, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001; 
Hellmann, 2001; Smith, 2001; Schweinbacher, 2001); 
 
(6) Empirical research examining the performance of venture-backed IPOs (Barry et al., 
1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991, Lin and Smith, 1997; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; 
Ljungqvist, 1999; Franzke, 2001; among others); 
 
(7) Empirical research examining the complete choice of different venture capital exit 
vehicles (IPOs, acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks, and write-offs) based on the 
characteristics of the entrepreneurial firms and venture capital funds (MacIntosh, 
1997; Black and Gilson, 1998; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Schweinbacher, 
2002; Flemming, 2002), and related empirical research explaining the risk and return 
to venture capital (Cochrane, 2001; Smith and Smith, 2000; Manignart et al., 2000). 
 
Previous venture capital research has not considered the allocation of control rights when 
securities other than convertible preferred equity are employed.  In addition, previous research 
has not fully analyzed which types of investments and contracts typically lead to ‘superior’ 
results, in terms of the selected exit vehicle as well as the internal rate of return (IRR).  The 
following sections provide an analysis of a new dataset that shed light on these issues, and 
suggest avenues for further research. 
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III. DATA 
 
A. Description of the Data 
 
We consider the contracts and exits from a hand-collected sample of 17 European venture 
capital funds.  The data comprise 179 investment rounds in 132 entrepreneurial firms (portfolio 
size ranges from 2 – 20 entrepreneurial firms per fund).  The VC funds are based in Austria (1 
fund), Belgium (1), Czech Republic (1), Denmark (1), France (1), Germany (4), Italy (2), Poland 
(1), Switzerland (1) and The Netherlands (4).  As with U.S.-based research with data of similar 
scope (Gompers, 1997; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002), as well as European research (Maginart et 
al., 2000; Schweinbacher, 2002), the funds were selected based on their willingness to disclose 
very detailed confidential information about their contracts and exits.  We interpret the results 
from this sample of funds within the institutional context. 
 
Thirty-three actual exits and 38 expected exits are observed in the data: 10 actual IPOs; 
13 actual acquisitions; 10 actual write-offs; 12 expected IPOs; 25 expected acquisitions; and 1 
expected write-down of the book value of an investment (which is analogous to a partial write-
off; see Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002).  The data do not appear to be driven towards the most 
successful or ‘best’ investments.  The frequency of dispositions is similar to related papers on VC 
exits (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Cochrane, 2001; Schweinbacher, 2002).  That most of the 
investments (99 of the 132) have not been exited indicates that the data are based on recent 
transactions as from the date of data collection (November 2001 – February 2002).  This is not 
surprising, given the data collection was facilitated via the use of surveys and numerous 
interviews with VC fund managers. 
 
 For reasons of confidentiality, the data are not presented by individual venture capital 
fund.  Nevertheless, the results are not attributable to the presence of any fund, group of funds, 
and/or type of fund in the data.  For example, most every fund in the sample uses a variety of 
forms of finance (there were two exceptions: 1 fund used mostly convertible preferred equity, and 
one fund used mostly common equity).  As well, most of the regression analyses below 
incorporate fixed effect VC fund dummy variables.  Note that an alternative (and nearly 
equivalent) specification for the regressions in each of the tables is with location dummy 
variables (i.e., institutional and legal differences across the countries in the data).  These 
regressions yielded nearly identical results (and are available upon request).  In addition, note that 
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the presence of buyout investments in the data does not materially change any of the main results 
(the tables without buyouts are available upon request). 
 
 The data on the types of contracts selected are summarized in Tables 1a – 1f.  The data 
are presented by entrepreneurial firm (with the one exception in Table 1a, where the number of 
financing rounds are reported in column 4).  The types of securities used are broken down into 
four main categories: common equity, convertible preferred equity, mixes of common and 
preferred equity, and mixes of debt with common equity.  As well, the (rare) cases in which 
syndicated VCs used different financing instruments are reported (see Schindele, 2002, for a 
theoretical analysis).  Consistent with research from outside the U.S. – see Bascha and Walz 
(2001), Cumming (2000), Smith and Parhankangas (2001), Songtao (2001), etc. – common equity 
is used most frequently by venture capitalists, but a variety of forms of finance are observed. 
 
[Tables 1a – 1f About Here] 
 
 Table 1a summarizes the data by the number of cases in which the respondent VC fund 
was the lead investor, the number of syndicated investments and financing rounds, and the 
number of VC board seats.  We do not observe many financing rounds, nor do we observe 
significant variation among the financing rounds in this dataset (see Gompers, 1997, and Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2002, for greater variation across financing rounds in the U.S.).  All the data and 
regressions in this paper are therefore presented by the 132 entrepreneurial firms, and not by the 
179 investment rounds. 
 
Table 1b indicates the stages of development of the entrepreneurial firms in the sample, 
as well as the industries.  The investment stages are commonly used by the European Venture 
Capital Association (www.evca.com), as well as in the United States (www.vfinance.com, 
www.ventureeconomics.com, www.v1.com), Canada (www.canadavc.com) and other countries. 
 
Table 1c relates the selected forms of finance to exits (both actual and expected).  The 
relations between these variables are considered in more detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
Tables 1d – 1f report the data relating the securities to the specific contractual 
contingencies (see Appendix A for examples), veto rights and various control rights (see 
Appendix B for examples).  Categories of particular contractual contingencies are based on those 
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reported by Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) in the U.S., as similar contingencies are found in the 
European VC data: financial, non-financial, certain actions, and sale of equity (see Appendix A).  
The European data distinguish between contingencies designed to for motivate the entrepreneur 
from contingencies designed to motivate the venture capitalist or syndicated investors. 
 
 Table 2a indicates the frequency of exits by firm characteristics, and Table 2b indicates 
the frequency of exits by control rights. Average IRRs are slightly higher for actual acquisitions 
than actual IPOs (and the reverse is true for expected exits), but these differences in means are not 
statistically significant (t-statistics for differences in average IRRs for actual and expected IPOs 
and acquisitions were less than 1.0). 
 
[Tables 2a and 2b About Here] 
 
An interesting feature of the data is the presence of a greater number of reported expected 
acquisitions.  Many VC fund managers did not expect the IPO market to be ‘strong enough’ over 
the coming months, up to year 2004.  ‘Preplanned’ was given as the primary reason for exit in 
most cases (46).  There were also 4 unsolicited offers, 12 exits for reasons of market conditions, 7 
internal conflicts giving rise to write-offs, 2 exits for fundraising reasons, and 1 exit inspired by 
fund termination.  The respondent VC controlled the exit in most (52) cases.  Conflicts regarding 
the exit process were rare: 8 surrounded the timing of the exit, and 1 was regarding valuation.  It 
is noteworthy, however, that 5 of the 10 actual IPOs involved a conflict about the timing of the 
exit, and 1 actual IPO involved a conflict about the valuation. 
 
B. Are Different Securities in VC Contracts Functionally Equivalent?  Univariate Tests 
 
Theoretical research has offered many explanations for the financial structure of U.S. 
VC-backed entrepreneurial firms: U.S. VCs finance U.S. entrepreneurial firms with the use of 
convertible preferred equity. As explained by Gilson and Schizer (2002), there are at least four 
limiting aspects of this theoretical research.  First, the formal attributes of convertible preferred 
equity, such as liquidation and dividend preference, are insubstantial in practice because failed 
entrepreneurial ventures typically do not have assets for distribution to VCs.7  Second, the 
theories cannot explain the use of convertible preferred equity in particular, rather than financial 
contracts that are functionally equivalent.  Third, Gilson and Schizer explain the fact that some 
theories are unlikely to operate as modeled, such as the allocation of control between 
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entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in exit.  Fourth, existing models cannot explain the fact that 
VCs in different countries use a variety of forms of finance.8  Even sophisticated U.S. VCs use 
different forms of finance when they invest in entrepreneurial firms located in different countries, 
such as Canada (Cumming, 2002).  Gilson and Schizer (2002) explain that the prevalent use of 
convertible preferred equity for U.S. venture backed firms is primarily related to the fact that U.S. 
tax practice enables more favorable entrepreneurial incentive compensation. 
 
If U.S. tax law colors the selected form of finance for venture-backed firms in the U.S., 
then it is important to test financial contracting theories using data from entrepreneurial firms in 
countries other than the U.S. for at least three reasons.  First, with U.S. data, it is not directly 
possible to ascertain whether convertible preferred equity is optimal in the absence of a tax bias 
favoring the use of such securities.  Second, it is not possible to test the relationship between 
different forms of finance and various control rights if tax laws exogenously determine the 
selected security.  Third, it is not possible to ascertain whether the use of different securities is 
related to differences in exit strategies. 
 
 Table 3a summarizes the data by providing statistical tests for the significance of the 
correlation coefficients between the securities and various other variables (actually, the reported 
significance test is the Chi-squared for the cross-tabulations; see Greene, 1998, p.245). 
 
[Table 3a About Here] 
 
 Importantly, Table 3a indicates that the use of specific contingencies is complementary to 
the financing instrument.9  Contingencies are statistically more likely to be used for both the VC 
and the entrepreneur when convertible preferred equity is the selected financing instrument.  
When common equity is selected, contingencies are statistically less likely to be employed.  
When mixes of debt and common equity are used, or mixes of preferred equity and common 
equity are used, there is no statistical relationship to the use of specific contingencies. 
 
 The use of veto rights is statistically negatively related to the use of common equity, and 
statistically positively related to the use of convertible preferred equity.  Veto rights are also 
statistically positively related to mixes of preferred and common, but statistically independent of 
debt and common equity. 
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 Similar to the relation between veto rights and security choice is the relation between 
other control rights and security choice.  VCs typically have fewer control rights with common 
equity, and more control rights when mixes of preferred and common are used.  When 
convertible preferred equity is used, VCs are less likely to have the right to replace the CEO and 
have redemption rights, but more likely to have information rights and the right of first refusal in 
sale of the firm as well as protection rights against new issues.  Most of the specific control rights 
are independent of the security choice when mixes of debt and common equity are used. 
 
 VCs obtain statistically smaller ownership percentages when convertible preferred equity 
is the selected financing instrument, and statistically greater ownership percentages when mixes 
of preferred and common are used.  The univariate tests reveal no statistical relation between 
ownership percentage and the use of common equity or mixes of debt and common equity. 
 
 VCs are statistically more likely to obtain a majority of the board seats when mixes of 
debt and common equity are used.  Obtaining a majority of the board is unrelated to the other 
types of securities in the univariate tests. 
 
Convertible preferred equity is more likely to be used with seed and early stage 
investments, and with firms in the Internet/communications sectors.  Common equity is used 
more often for expansion stage investments and firms in the medical/biotech industries. 
 
In sum, different securities are functionally distinct.  Specific contractual terms are not 
used so that different securities may mimic one another.  That is, the specific terms appear to be 
complements with the security choice.  Why?  Many VCs indicated that the particular deals with 
simple payoff structures (common equity) are typically associated with few contractual 
provisions (such as veto rights and other specific control rights) because the important 
distinguishing aspect of the deal is in its simplicity.  Lead investors often ‘shy away’ from 
complicated structures that do not facilitate room for negotiation with potentially new syndicated 
outside investors (see Lerner, 1994, on the relation between lead and follow-on investors).  
Moreover, entrepreneurs are often dissuaded by excessively complicated financing arrangements 
(see Black and Gilson, 1998, on ‘implicit’ contracts in venture capital, and subsection III.C 
below).  Low IRRs have in some cases been attributed to excessively complicated deal structures. 
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C. Are Different Contracts Related to Different Exit Vehicles?  Univariate Tests 
 
Similar to Table 3a, Table 3b summarizes the data by providing statistical tests for the 
significance of the correlation coefficients between the different exit vehicles and various other 
variables (as mentioned above, the reported significance test is the Chi-squared for the cross-
tabulations; see Greene, 1998, p.245). 
 
[Table 3b About Here] 
 
Table 3b indicates two main findings.  First, the use of common equity is more often 
related to IPO exits, and less often to acquisitions.  Second, the use of specific control rights and 
veto rights (which are related to convertibles; see Table 3a) are more often associated with 
acquisition exits, not IPOs.  This supports Black and Gilson’s (1998) implicit contracting theory.  
Black and Gilson argue that there is often an implicit contract between VCs and entrepreneurs to 
transfer control back to the entrepreneur upon an IPO exit (which is in the interest of the 
entrepreneur).  IPOs are observed with greater frequency when there are not many explicit 
covenants in the form of veto rights and control rights.  In contrast, when many explicit covenants 
are used, acquisitions are the more common outcome. 
 
In the subsections below, we consider in a multivariate framework the allocation of 
various control rights and choice of security (section IV).  We also consider the likelihood of 
different exits based on the type of firm and type of contract in a multivariate setting (section V). 
 
IV. WHAT DETERMINES THE SECURITY, VC OWNERSHIP %, BOARD SEATS, VETO & 
CONTROL RIGHTS?  MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
A. Sequence of Decisions 
 
 Interviews with many European venture capital fund managers indicated the following 
typical sequence of events in designing venture capital contracts.  First, the required rate of return 
is determined to make the investment worthwhile (depending on firm characteristics – 
technology, development stage, etc.).  This involves selecting a security that will provide the 
payoff to fit with the risk and required return. It is noteworthy that VC funds typically do not care 
about the downside.  Similarly, Gilson and Schizer (2002) note that VCs rarely care about 
bankruptcy proceedings because the few assets remaining in a bankrupt VC investment are 
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typically absent of any meaningful value. Second, ownership percentages and board seats are 
allocated, subject to the selected security.  Third, over a negotiation period (typically a few 
months, and longer in poor economic conditions), specific control rights are allocated depending 
on the ownership structure and security to make sure both parties are ‘happy’ and the deal 
proceeds forward. 
 
The multivariate regression equations below are based on this sequence of decisions.  An 
issue that arises is in the joint determination of some of the variables in the various tables (but the 
main results are robust to alternative specifications; alternatives are available upon request).  
Table 4 provides correlation coefficients across many of the variables used in the various 
regressions.  There are only a few significant correlation coefficients.  Nevertheless, the results 
are not biased by collinearity between the explanatory variables, or by problems of endogeneity, 
etc.  Given the large number of tables presented, additional tables with supporting robustness 
checks are not provided (but are available upon request).  While most regressions employ fixed 
effects for different VC funds, the results are fairly robust to the simpler alternative specification 
of using a constant without fixed effects.  In all regressions, White’s HCCME is used. 
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
B. What Determines the Selected Security? 
 
 Cumming (2000) (with Canadian VC data) and Bascha and Walz (2001) (with German 
VC data) have considered determinants of the form of finance based on the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial firm receiving financing.  Our analysis is similar.  Table 5 provides binomial logit 
(Table 5a) and multinomial logit (Theil, 1969) (Table 5b) regressions of the determinants of the 
selected security based on the development stage of the entrepreneurial firm (late, turnaround and 
buyout stages are suppressed to avoid collinerity problems), the amount invested (book value), 
whether the VC was the lead investor, the number of syndicated partners, whether there was a 
preplanned IPO or acquisition, and the industry in which the entrepreneurial firm operates 
(medical/biotech, electronics/computer, and communications/Internet10). 
 
[Tables 5a and 5b About Here] 
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 The binomial and multinomial logit specifications yield quite robust results.  The 
coefficients for the seed, early and expansion dummy variables indicate that convertible preferred 
equity securities are most likely.  This is consistent with most academic venture capital research 
indicating convertible preferred equity is the optimal security (see, e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Cornelli 
and Yosha, 1997; Gompers, 1997; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). 
 
The binomial logit estimates indicate (at the 1% level of significance) that lead investors 
are less likely to use convertible preferred equity. Some European lead investors indicated they 
often do not use complicated financing structures in order to facilitate negotiation with potentially 
new syndicated outside investors. 
 
There are other characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm, as well as characteristics of the 
investor(s) that may affect the selected form of finance.  However, in the multinomial logit 
setting, the variables other than the stage of development variables are generally insignificant (see 
Cumming, 2000, and Bascha and Walz, 2001, for contrasting evidence). 
 
 The predictive power of the regression models is indicated at the bottom of the tables.  
The match between actual and predicted outcomes is fairly strong, but not perfect.  Other less-
visible factors may play a role (e.g., a behavioral finance type variable such as ‘a need for 
simplicity’, and other entrepreneur firm variables could be used, based on interviews with VCs). 
 
C. What Determines VC Ownership Percentage and the Percentage of VC Board Seats? 
 
 Table 6 presents regressions for the determinants of VC ownership percentage.11 Three 
binomial logit regressions are provided for the following left-hand side variable: (model 1) 
respondent VC ownership >50%, (model 2) respondent + syndicated VC ownership >50%, and 
(model 3) contingent VC equity ownership (specific clauses aside from the security itself giving 
the investor more equity in cases of poor performance of the entrepreneurial firm).  As well, two 
OLS regressions are provided for (model 4) the respondent VC’s ownership percentage and 
(model 5) the sum of the respondent VC and the syndicated VCs’ ownership percentage.12 
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
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 The regression results indicate contingent VC equity ownership (model 3) is significantly 
less likely for seed and early stage firms.  Firms in these early development stages typically do 
not have positive cash flows; therefore, contracts allocating equity contingent on performance are 
not as feasible.  There is evidence that seed investments give the VC a large equity % (models 1 
and 5), possibly to compensate the investor for the risks associated with such early stage 
investments.  In contrast, expansion stage investments are more typically associated with lower a 
VC ownership % (models 1, 2, 4 and 5). 
 
 There is evidence that larger VC investments increase VC ownership %, as would be 
expected (see, e.g., Noe and Rebello, 1996, Propositions 3 and 4), but this result is only 
significant in model 2.  Similarly, the greater the number of syndicated investors, the smaller the 
equity ownership of each VC (model 1 and 4). 
 
 Contracts with contingent equity allocations are complementary to the security: they are 
used with convertible preferred equity (model 3).  Larger VC equity ownership % is associated 
with contracts involving mixes of debt and common equity (models 4 and 5). 
 
 VCs take a majority ownership % when they are preplanning an acquisition exit (model 
1).  This is consistent with Black and Gilson (1998).  Black and Gilson argue that entrepreneurs 
prefer IPO exits insofar as the entrepreneurial team regains control over the firm upon an IPO exit 
(acquisitions transfer control to the acquiror). 
 
 Industry dummy variables indicate tech entrepreneurial firms – particularly those in the 
Internet/communications industries – are less likely to involve majority VC equity ownership 
(models 1 and 2). 
 
 Similar to Table 6, Table 7 presents 5 regressions for the determinants of VC board seats.  
The results are quite consistent with those in Table 6. 
 
[Table 7 About Here] 
 
 VCs typically do not take a majority of the board for seed, early and expansion stage 
investments.  However, the greater the VC ownership %, the VC will take a larger % of the board 
seats, and will more often control the board. 
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As with contingent equity ownership %, contracts involving contingent board seats in 
cases of poor performance are used for expansion stage investments, but not seed and early stage 
investments.  Again, as with contingent equity ownership %, contingent board seats complement 
the security: convertible preferred equity, not common equity or mixes of debt and common 
equity.  It is also noteworthy that VCs typically take fewer board seats when convertible preferred 
equity is used. 
 
The evidence indicates that for investments in which exit is preplanned (both preplanned 
IPOs and preplanned acquisitions), VCs take relatively fewer board seats.  While this may be 
somewhat surprising, as discussed below, VCs can control the exit decision in other ways (i.e., 
independently allocate control over exit). 
 
Investments in high-tech industries also appear to typically involve fewer VC board seats.  
We may have expected greater VC board representation among firms in industries where assets 
are typically intangible and more monitoring is required.  Nevertheless, contingent VC board 
seats are more likely for the high-tech firms (at least those in the biotech/medical industries). 
 
D. What Determines the use of Contractual Contingencies? 
 
 Table 8 presents logit regressions for the determinants of contractual contingencies that 
are designed to provide effort incentives to the entrepreneur and/or the venture capitalist (specific 
contractual terms not directly part of the financing instrument; see Appendix A). 
 
[Table 8 About Here] 
 
 Interestingly, VCs are less likely to use self-motivating contractual terms when they act 
in the capacity of lead investor.  Based on conversations with venture capitalists, the reason is 
simple: it is more difficult to develop syndication relationships with outside investors when such 
clauses are part of the lead investor’s contract with the entrepreneur. 
 
 When VCs take a majority stake in the firm, incentive clauses are used significantly less 
frequently.  Similarly, there is some evidence that incentive clauses for the entrepreneur are less 
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likely (specifically clauses pertaining to non-financial performance and certain actions) when the 
VC provides more capital. 
 
 Consistent with contingent board seat allocation (see subsection IV.C.), the use of 
specific contingent incentive clauses for both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs appears to be 
complementary with the particular security: they are used more frequently with convertible 
preferred equity, and less frequently with common equity.  As discussed in section III, this is 
further evidence that different securities are not functionally equivalent. 
 
 Contingent clauses for entrepreneurs are used more frequently in medical/biotech 
industries. Interviews with VC fund managers revealed that entrepreneurs in the industries are 
necessarily provided with specific incentives to obtain patents, and achieve other milestones. 
 
 Finally, the evidence indicates preplanned exits involve contingencies for both the 
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist so that both have incentives to ensure that exit objectives 
are fulfilled. 
 
E. When Do VCs Use Veto Rights? 
 
 Table 9 presents logit estimates for the determinants of veto rights over asset sales, asset 
purchases, changes in control and other decisions. 
 
[Table 9 About Here] 
 
 Veto rights are most often used in the seed stage of development, and are less common in 
the early and expansion stages.  This reflects the difficulty that venture capitalists face in terms of 
widely recognized agency problems, such as risk shifting, etc., among very young firms where 
the direction of the firm is highly variable.  Lead investors are also more likely to use veto rights. 
 
 As with the evidence in the previous subsections, the use of veto rights is complementary 
to the security choice.  Veto rights are more common with convertible securities.  Therefore, for 
example, while convertibles mitigate risk-shifting agency problems (Green, 1984), they are used 
in conjunction with veto rights.  Veto rights are less likely to be used with other securities. 
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Similarly, when the VC has board control, veto rights are more likely for decisions over 
asset sales.  This further supports the view that contractual terms are complementary, and not 
substitutes. 
 
 In this sample, veto rights are more frequently used in biotech/medical and 
computer/electronics industries. 
 
F. How Are Control Rights Allocated when Capital Structure is Flexible? 
 
 Logit regressions for the determinants of specific control rights (see Appendix B for 
examples) are presented in Table 10. 
 
[Table 10 About Here] 
 
Accounting for other firm characteristics (discussed below), the early development stage 
firms (seed, early and expansion stages) are statistically less likely to be financed under most of 
these control rights. 
 
 Lead investors typically require most of the control rights (with the exception of 
automatic conversion upon IPO). 
 
 VC funds that hold a majority of the board seats also hold a specific contractual right to 
replace the CEO.  Common equity contracts typically involve few specific control rights.  Both of 
these results provide further support for the view that VC contractual terms are complementary. 
 
 Convertible preferred equity contracts typically also involve the right of first refusal in 
sale, as well as demand registration rights and piggyback registration rights.  Consistent with 
Berglöf (1994), this indicates that convertible preferred equity mitigates trilateral bargaining 
problems associated with the sale of the firm,13 and the particular associated contractual terms to 
mitigate this trilateral bargaining problem are complements with the selected security.  
Convertible preferred equity is not statistically related to the use of other control rights. 
 
 Control rights are more common among medical/biotech and computer/electronic firms 
than Internet/communications firms in the sample. 
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 Interestingly, control rights are used much more frequently when there is a preplanned 
acquisition as opposed to a preplanned IPO.  Consistent with Black and Gilson (1998), 
entrepreneurs typically prefer IPO exits so that they may regain control over the firm upon VC 
exit.  When acquisitions are planned, VCs typically put in place a greater number of contractual 
mechanisms to effect an acquisition exit. 
 
 The following section considers the normative implications of financing different 
entrepreneurial firms with different contracts. 
 
V. HOW WELL DO INVESTMENTS PERFORM UNDER ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTS?  
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 In the preceding section we presented statistics and regressions for determinants of 
contract choice.  In this section our attention is focused on the implications associated with the 
use of different contractual terms.  Two questions arise.  First, how is the exit vehicle affected by 
the specific contractual terms, controlling for other firm characteristics?  Second, do different 
contracts affect IRRs given the other firm characteristics? 
 
 We caution that only 33 of the 132 portfolio companies in the sample have been exited.  
The actual exits span the period from 1997 – 2001.  We control for exits for reasons of ‘market 
conditions’.  There are also 38 expected exits, up to year 2004.  While many statistically 
significant results are obtainable from the sample, the data also suggest avenues for further 
normative research. 
 
A. Choice of Exit Vehicle 
 
 Table 11 presents regressions for the determinants of exit choice (both actual and 
expected14).  Fixed effect dummies are used to control for differences between actual and 
expected exits in some of the specifications to illustrate robustness. Degrees of freedom do not 
permit inclusion of every specific contractual clause in the regressions; therefore, variables that 
aggregate the number of contingencies (subsection IV.D; Appendix A), veto rights (subsection 
IV.E), and control rights (subsection IV.F; Appendix B) are employed. 
 
[Table 11 About Here] 
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 The evidence indicates that IPOs are more likely when common equity is used, and when 
there are a greater number of incentive contingencies in contracts.15  There has been theoretical 
research connecting convertible securities to exit strategies (e.g., Berglöf, 1994; Bascha and 
Walz, 2001; Hellmann, 2001).  Because VCs outside the U.S. most often use forms of finance 
other than convertible preferred equity (or functional equivalents), future theoretical research 
relating alternative forms of finance and specific contractual clauses to the exit strategy would be 
fruitful.  Because the evidence herein is suggestive that specific control and veto rights with 
convertibles securities are less frequently associated with IPOs, it is supportive of Black and 
Gilson’s (1998) implicit contracting theory of control transfer back to entrepreneurs upon IPO.  
VC control rights are used to effect acquisitions. 
 
Market conditions also significantly increase the likelihood of an IPO exit.  IPOs are also 
more likely when there are a greater number of syndicated VC investors.  This evidence supports 
related research.  Gompers and Lerner (1999) show U.S. VCs are particularly skilled at timing the 
IPO market, and VC syndicates facilitate certification of entrepreneurial firm quality upon IPO 
(and possibly enable the VCs to collude and overstate entrepreneurial firm value upon exit). 
 
 Table 11 indicates that write-offs occur after the shortest investment duration: bad 
information is revealed quickly (this is consistent with Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002).  The 
duration of investment does not impact upon the decision of an IPO versus an acquisition.  Firms 
with the lowest market/book ratios obviously are written off, but there is no evidence that 
market/book differences affect the likelihood of an IPO or acquisition in this dataset.16 
 
 When entrepreneurs control the exit decision, IPOs are more likely, and write-offs are 
less likely.  Again, this is consistent with Black and Gilson’s view that entrepreneurs prefer IPOs 
to regain control over the firm.  It is also consistent with Petty et al.’s (1999) case studies on 
entrepreneur’s attachment to their firms – their reluctance to sell the firm in an acquisition, and 
their reluctance to write-off their companies. 
 
B. Determinants of IRR 
 
Cochrane (2001, page 2) recognizes some distinguishing features of venture capital 
investing: poor liquidity, poor diversification, and information and monitoring.  Gompers and 
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Lerner (1999) have extensively analyzed these aspects of venture capital investing.  Cochrane, 
however, also states (page 2): “On the other hand, venture capital is a competitive business with 
free entry... Many venture capital firms are large enough to effectively diversify their portfolios.  
The special relationship, information and monitoring stories suggest a restricted supply of venture 
capital may be overblown.  Private equity may be just like public equity.”  Cochrane therefore 
bases the measure of risk and return of venture capital on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM).  The distinguishing feature of Cochrane’s paper is the use of selection effects associated 
with the different exit vehicles.17 
 
A useful lecture prepared by Giorgio Szegö (2001) provides some guidance as to the 
applicability of the CAPM to the context of venture capital.  Szegö (at page 3) stresses that “[i]f 
the joint distribution function of the n returns of a portfolio is elliptical, then and only then the 
Markowitz-Sharpe mean-variance-ß can be used.”  It is noteworthy that t-distributions are 
elliptical, and normal distributions are spherical (a special case of an ellipsoid), but it is highly 
unlikely that the returns to venture capital are elliptical.  The returns to venture capital are 
multimodal (MacIntosh, 1997; 1999; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002, 2003; Smith and Smith, 
2000; Cochrane, 2001): there is a high percentage (typically around 25% of all investments) of 
write-offs (-100% return), many investments generate a “good” annualized return of between 25-
100%, and the lions-share of venture capital profits comes from a few very successful “home-
run” investments with returns of more than 500%. 
 
 We therefore do not use a market model to explain returns.  Most venture capital funds 
are not well diversified (the funds in this sample had between 2 and 20 investments in their 
portfolios); see also Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2001a,b).  The view taken here is that returns 
primarily depend on the characteristics of the investee and the nature of the contracts employed.18 
 
Table 12 presents multivariate regressions for the determinants of IRRs for both the 
actual and expected exits together, as well as the actual exits separately.  (IRRs for expected exits 
were calculated on the basis of market values of the investees as at September 2001.)  While a 
large number of variables are included, the results are quite robust to the inclusion/exclusion of 
other variables (details are available upon request).  The results with a fairly complete set of 
variables under 4 alternative specifications are discussed below.  It is noteworthy that the 
predictive power of the model is strong: for the actual exits the adjusted R2 is greater than 85%. 
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[Table 12 About Here] 
 
 Table 12 indicates IPOs and acquisitions (naturally) give rise to higher returns (a dummy 
for write-offs was suppressed to avoid collinearity).  The difference between the IPO and 
acquisition coefficient values was not statistically significant. 
 
Higher VC ownership percentages also increased the IRRs to the VCs in the subsample 
of actual exits (Table 12), and medical/biotech and Internet/communications industries had 
significantly higher IRRs in the sample. 
 
 The variable for market conditions in Table 12 is negative and significant, because 
market conditions sometimes gave rise to write-offs in this sample.  Earlier stage investments also 
yielded lower IRRs, due to the write-offs in the sample from those investment stages. 
 
 The use of convertible preferred equity, and mixes of common equity and debt give rise 
to lower IRRs in this sample.  Common equity, on the other hand, does not lower IRRs.  The 
results are suggestive that simple financial structures ‘work well’.  Further empirical research is 
warranted. 
 
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 The degrees of freedom do not permit inclusion of every specific contractual clause in the 
regressions in Table 11 and 12.  Therefore, variables that aggregate the number of contingencies 
(subsection IV.D), veto rights (subsection IV.E), and control rights (subsection IV.F) are 
employed.  IRRs were higher when VCs had a greater number of veto rights, but lower when 
contracts contained a greater number of control rights.  Again, these results are suggestive of the 
value of particular clauses in VC contracts, but the limitations of the data (particularly the 
aggregation of clauses of similar type due to the limitation in degrees of freedom) give rise to a 
need for further research.  As well, while we have used dummies for investor effects (or 
equivalently, country effects), further research on the impact of laws and institutions on contract 
structure and exit choice would be worthwhile (see also Black and Gilson, 1998). 
 
 It is noteworthy that the VC funds in this dataset typically do not serve on boards of 
directors of entrepreneurial firms after 1 year of the exit date.  (There were 2 exceptions for the 
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IPO exits – one actual IPO and one expected IPO – and in the expected exit, it was the syndicated 
VC that was expected to remain on the board).  Similarly, VC funds maintained an ownership 
interest in the entrepreneurial firm for more than one year after exit in only three exits (two of 
these cases overlapped with the two cases of VC board representation for more than 1 year after 
exit). 
 
Three of the acquisition exits in this sample involved some exchange of shares (instead of 
complete payment in cash).  Share consideration in acquisition exits is analogous to a partial 
acquisition (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002).  The three cases were not materially different from 
the other acquisitions in this sample.  Further research with additional European data would be 
worthwhile. 
 
Finally, further research on the long-term performance of European VC IPO and 
acquisition exits depending on the role of the VC fund(s) pre- and post-exit, and on the nature of 
financial contracts between entrepreneurs and VCs and would be fruitful (see Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999, 2001, 2002, for related U.S.-based VC research). 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 The empirical evidence provided in this paper adds to the understanding of venture 
capital finance in two important respects.  First, venture capital contracts for different types of 
entrepreneurial firms are functionally distinct.  They can involve different securities (common 
equity, convertible preferred equity, mixes of debt and common, and mixes of preferred and 
common).  They can also involve other specific contractual provisions pertaining to control 
rights, veto rights, board seats, etc.  Each of these contractual provisions tends to be 
complementary, not substitutes.  As such, different contracts are not functional equivalents. 
 
 Second, the use of different contracts – both the securities and specific contractual terms 
pertaining to cash flow and control rights – are important insofar as they play a role in 
determining the eventual exit vehicle selected, as well as the VC’s IRR.  Venture capital is non-
diversified, value-added, active investing.  Returns are a function of the types of entrepreneurial 
firms financed and the governance mechanisms used to oversee these firms. 
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 The empirical evidence herein provides insight along these two dimensions.  We hope 
that this evidence inspires further theoretical and empirical research so that we may better 
understand the financing process, and better evaluate the normative implications associated with 
different contracts and investments in different types of entrepreneurial firms. 
 
Appendix A: Examples of Various Contractual Contingencies19 
 
Financial contingencies: Employee shares vest if revenue goals attained; VC can only vote for all 
owned shares if realized EBIT below threshold value, in which case VC always gets voting 
control; VC dividend on preferred shares, payable in common stock, is suspended depending on 
actual revenues and operating profits versus expected revenue and profit goals; exercise price on 
warrants is fraction of net worth: (e.g.) 50% of net worth/share for first three years, then 100% of 
net worth/share; VC warrants expire if revenue goal attained; Committed round of financing 
contingent on no material deviation from business plan. 
 
Non-financial contingencies: Committed round of financing contingent on no material deviation 
from non-financial aspects of business plan; Employee shares vest when company secures 
threshold number of customers who have purchased the product and give positive feedback; 
Employee shares vest when release of new major version of the product which incorporates 
significant new functionality; Founder shares vest contingent on governmental approval of new 
drug; Founder shares vest contingent on new corporate partnership found; Founder shares vest 
contingent on approved patents; Founder loses voting right for shares if terminated for cause 
(e.g., illegal activities, etc.); Committed funding paid out when new clinical tests completed; 
Committed funding paid out when new strategic partnership completed. 
 
Certain actions taken contingencies: Committed funding paid out subject to new business plan for 
entering new markets completed and approved by board; Vesting of shares contingent on hiring 
new key executives; Committed funding paid out subject to hiring new key executives or CEO; 
Committed funding paid out subject to developing new facilities. 
 
Sale of equity contingencies: Founder ownership increasing non-linear function of share price 
obtained in sale or IPO; Founder vesting accelerates upon sale or IPO of certain minimum value; 
Cumulative dividend (in stock or cash) suspended upon sale or IPO of certain minimum value; 
Conversion price of VC convertibles higher if company completes sale of new equity where 
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proceeds exceed minimum amount; VC warrants expire if company manages to raise alternative 
funds where proceeds and price of equity exceeds threshold; VC warrants expire upon IPO of 
minimum value; Committed funding paid out when new vendor financing agreements secured; 
Committed funding paid out when new construction loans secured; VC dividend on preferred 
shares, payable in common stock, is suspended if company manages to raise certain amount of 
new funding above minimum price per share. 
 
Appendix B: Examples of Contractual Clauses Pertaining to Control Rights20 
 
Right of First Refusal: The Investors shall have the right in the event the Company proposes to 
offer equity securities to any person (with exceptions).  This right typically terminates upon IPO. 
 
Co-sale Agreement: The entrepreneurial managers may not sell, transfer, or exchange their stock 
unless each investor has an opportunity to participate in the sale on a pro rata basis.  The right of 
co-sale shall not apply to and shall not terminate upon the Company’s initial public offering.   
 
Antidilution Provisions: The conversion price of convertible securities are subject to a weighted 
average adjustment to reduce dilution in the event that the Company issues additional equity 
securities (other than employee, director, and consultant shares approved by the Board of 
Directors) at a purchase price less than the applicable conversion price. 
 
Protection Rights Against New Issues: Consent of the investors shall be required for any investee 
action that changes the shareholder rights and privileges of the investors. 
 
Redemption at Option of Investors: Commencing on some particular date (e.g., in the fifth 
anniversary of the Closing), at the election of the investors, the Company shall redeem their 
outstanding shares.  Such redemption shall be at the Original Purchase Price plus any unpaid 
cumulative dividends. 
 
Information Rights in Operating Plans and Financials: The Company shall deliver to the Investor 
audited annual and unaudited quarterly financial statements.  Each investor shall also be entitled 
to standard inspection and visitation rights.  These provisions shall terminate upon a registered 
public offering of the Company’s Common Stock. 
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IPO Demand Registration Rights: The investors may force the company to file a Registration 
Statement for the Registrable Securities.  The Company will use its best efforts to cause such 
shares to be registered; provided, however, that the Company shall not be obligated to effect any 
such registration prior to a certain specified date. 
 
Piggyback Registration Rights: The Investors shall be entitled to “piggyback” registration rights 
on all registrations of the Company or on any demand registrations of any other investor subject 
to the right, however, of the Company and its underwriters to reduce the number of shares 
proposed to be registered pro rata in view of market conditions. 
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Total # Investees # Financing # Syndicated Total # # Respondent # Syndicated # Total
Type of Security # Investees As Lead Investor Rounds Investments Syndicated Partners VC Board Seats VC Board Seats Board Seats
Common Equity 57 40 78 47 54 64 67 299
Conv. Preferred Equity 24 12 32 13 24 22 17 99
Common + Conv. Preferred 3 3 3 1 3 7 1 23
Common + Preferred 19 13 20 9 9 17 10 68
Common + Conv. Preferred + Preferred 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 9
Sum of Preferred + Common Equity 23 17 25 11 15 26 15 100
Common + Conv. Debt 6 5 8 2 2 8 3 31
Common + Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 5
Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 4
Conv. Debt + Preferred + Conv. Preferred 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 6
Conv. Preferred + Debt 5 4 13 2 3 7 4 18
Common + Preferred + Debt 7 7 7 3 3 7 1 18
Common + Debt 7 7 13 3 3 13 5 35
Sum of Debt + Common Equity 28 25 44 12 15 38 17 117
Syndicated VCs Used Different Instrument? 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 13
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Common Equity 2 1 3 1 1 2 0 6
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Warrants 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 7
TOTALS 132 94 179 83 108 150 116 615
Table 1a.  Summary of the Data by Type of Security Used
This table presents, by type of security used, the number of portfolio investees where the respondent VC was the lead investor, the number of financing rounds, the number of syndicated partners, and details 
pertaining to board seats.
 
Total # Investees # Investees # Investees # Investees # Investees # Investees # Investees # Investees # Investees # Investees
Type of Security # Investees Seed Early Expansion Late Turnaround Buyout High-Tech Medical/Biotechnology Electronics/Computer Internet/Communication
Common Equity 57 4 12 26 3 1 11 36 12 12 12
Conv. Preferred Equity 24 7 10 6 0 0 1 20 3 3 14
Common + Conv. Preferred 3 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Common + Preferred 19 1 3 4 0 0 11 9 4 3 2
Common + Conv. Preferred + Preferred 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sum of Preferred + Common Equity 23 1 3 4 2 0 13 9 4 3 2
Common + Conv. Debt 6 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Common + Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred + Conv. Preferred 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Conv. Preferred + Debt 5 4 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 1 4
Common + Preferred + Debt 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 0 2 0
Common + Debt 7 0 2 0 0 0 5 3 1 2 0
Sum of Debt + Common Equity 28 5 2 7 0 1 13 13 1 6 6
Syndicated VCs Used Different Instrument? 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Common Equity 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Warrants 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 132 17 27 43 5 2 38 78 20 24 34
Table 1b.  Summary of the Data by Type of Security Used
This table presents, by type of security used, the number of portfolio investees at each of the different development stages, and the different industries.
 
Total Total # Actual Total # Expected Total # Total # Total # Actual Total # Expected Total # Actual Total # Expected
Type of Security # Investees Exits Reported Exits Reported Actual IPO Expected IPO Acquisitions Acquisitions Write-offs Write-downs
Common Equity 57 16 14 8 7 4 7 4 0
Conv. Preferred Equity 24 5 11 0 3 2 8 3 0
Common + Conv. Preferred 3 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 0
Common + Preferred 19 5 3 0 0 3 3 2 0
Common + Conv. Preferred + Preferred 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sum of Preferred + Common Equity 23 6 6 1 1 3 5 2 0
Common + Conv. Debt 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Common + Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred + Conv. Preferred 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. Preferred + Debt 5 1 4 0 1 0 2 1 1
Common + Preferred + Debt 7 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Common + Debt 7 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0
Sum of Debt + Common Equity 28 6 7 1 1 4 5 1 1
Syndicated VCs Used Different Instrument? 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Common Equity 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Warrants 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 132 33 38 10 12 13 25 10 1
Table 1c.  Summary of the Data by Type of Security Used
This table presents, by type of security used, the number of portfolio investees in high-tech industries, the book and market values of the investments, the ownership percentages, and the divestments (actual or expected).
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Total
Type of Security # Investees Financial Performance Non-Financial Performance Certain Actions Taken Sale of Shares Reporting VC Fund Other Syndicated VC Fund Entrepreneur
Common Equity 57 14 11 10 5 10 9 19
Conv. Preferred Equity 24 17 10 9 8 11 5 10
Common + Conv. Preferred 3 1 0 1 3 3 0 3
Common + Preferred 19 3 2 2 0 1 3 3
Common + Conv. Preferred + Preferred 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sum of Preferred + Common Equity 23 5 2 3 3 4 3 7
Common + Conv. Debt 6 3 1 1 0 3 0 2
Common + Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Conv. Debt + Preferred + Conv. Preferred 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Conv. Preferred + Debt 5 3 3 1 0 3 1 0
Common + Preferred + Debt 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Common + Debt 7 1 0 0 3 2 0 1
Sum of Debt + Common Equity 28 9 4 3 3 8 1 5
Syndicated VCs Used Different Instrument? 4 1 0 0 2 1 0 1
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Common Equity 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Warrants 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
TOTALS 132 45 27 25 19 33 18 41
This table presents, by type of security used, the number of portfolio investees involving covenants allowing future equity allocation to be contingent on measures of financial performance, non-financial performance, certain 
actions, and sale of shares.  The party for which the contingent equity was directly granted is also reported.
# Contracts with contingencies on… # Contracts with contingencies for…
Table 1d.  Summary of the Data by Type of Security Used
 
Total Average Increase in VC Equity Increase in VC board seats
Type of Security # Investees Asset Sales Asset Purchases Changes in Control Issuance of Equity Other % Ownership if poor performance if poor performance
Common Equity 57 24 25 31 30 32 33.5% 14 11
Conv. Preferred Equity 24 21 19 21 20 14 19.6% 7 6
Common + Conv. Preferred 3 3 3 3 3 3 57.7% 0 0
Common + Preferred 19 14 14 16 16 16 36.6% 4 4
Common + Conv. Preferred + Preferred 1 1 1 1 1 0 26.0% 0 0
Sum of Preferred + Common Equity 23 18 18 20 20 19 38.9% 4 4
Common + Conv. Debt 6 1 1 1 1 1 46.4% 0 0
Common + Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 1 1 1 1 1 38.6% 0 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 1 1 1 1 0 11.0% 0 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred + Conv. Preferred 1 1 1 1 1 1 25.0% 0 0
Conv. Preferred + Debt 5 5 4 4 4 4 57.8% 0 0
Common + Preferred + Debt 7 7 7 7 7 7 50.7% 0 0
Common + Debt 10 5 5 6 4 4 44.8% 0 0
Sum of Debt + Common Equity 31 21 20 21 19 18 46.8% 0 0
Syndicated VCs Used Different Instrument? 4 1 1 1 0 1 11.3% 1 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Common Equity 2 0 0 1 0 0 10.5% 0 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Warrants 2 1 1 0 0 1 12.1% 1 0
TOTALS 135 84 82 93 89 83 35.0% 25 21
Table 1e.  Summary of the Data by Type of Security Used
This table presents, by type of security used, the number of investments for which veto rights were used pertaining to asset sales, asset purchases, changes in control, and issuance of equity.  State contingent changes in VC 
ownership percentage and VC board seats for each fund are also reported.
# Investees for which specific veto rights used…
 
Total Right to Automatic conver- First refusal co-sale Antidillution Protection rights Redemption Information Demand regi- Piggyback regi-
Type of Security # Investees replace CEO sion rights in IPO in sale agreement protection against new issues rights rights stration rights stration rights
Common Equity 57 15 0 25 29 25 22 19 27 5 2
Conv. Preferred Equity 24 4 3 20 13 13 18 3 19 10 7
Common + Conv. Preferred 3 2 3 0 3 2 3 0 3 0 0
Common + Preferred 19 12 0 4 14 14 14 14 14 8 8
Common + Conv. Preferred + Preferred 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
Sum of Preferred + Common Equity 23 15 4 5 18 16 17 14 18 9 8
Common + Conv. Debt 6 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 0
Common + Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
Conv. Debt + Preferred + Conv. Preferred 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
Conv. Preferred + Debt 5 0 0 4 4 4 5 0 4 0 0
Common + Preferred + Debt 7 7 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Common + Debt 7 3 0 2 6 4 5 4 7 3 3
Sum of Debt + Common Equity 28 13 3 10 21 17 18 12 23 14 10
Syndicated VCs Used Different Instrument? 4 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Common Equity 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
If yes, Syndicated VCs used Warrants 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
TOTALS 132 47 10 60 81 71 75 48 87 38 27
Table 1f.  Summary of the Data by Type of Security Used
This table presents, by type of security used, the number of portfolio investees where the VC had the right to replace the CEO, automatic conversion rights in IPO, first refusal in sale, a co-sale agreement, antidillution 
protection, protection rights against new issues, redemption rights, information rights, demand registration rights and piggyback registration rights.
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Actual IPOs Expected IPOs Actual Acquisitions Expected Acquisitions Actual Write-offs Expected Write-downs
Average IRR 95.90% 23.25% 128.54% 7.09% -100.00% 0.00%
Standard Deviation IRR 142.00% 44.76% 149.34% 65.64% 0.00% 0.00%
Max IRR 500.00% 115.61% 566.00% 91.27% -100.00% 0.00%
Min IRR 30.00% 0.00% 27.00% -91.89% -100.00% 0.00%
Average Respondent VC Ownership % 54.22% 20.62% 44.73% 41.85% 27.26% 10.00%
Average Syndicated VC Ownership % 11.25% 11.09% 15.30% 12.88% 14.13% 20.00%
Preplanned Exit 5 11 9 21 0 0
Unsolicited Offer 0 0 3 1 0 0
Market Conditions 6 0 1 4 1 0
Internal Conflicts 0 0 0 0 7 0
VC Fundraising 0 1 0 1 0 0
Fund Termination 0 1 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 2 1
VC Controls Exit 8 6 10 20 8 0
Syndicated VC Controls Exit 1 2 0 1 2 0
Entrepreneur Controls Exit 1 4 3 4 0 1
Conflict re timing 5 0 1 2 0 0
Conflict re valuation 1 0 0 0 0 0
Common Equity 8 7 4 7 4 0
Convertible Preferred Equity 0 3 2 8 2 0
Mixed Preferred + Common 1 1 3 5 2 0
Mixed Debt + Common 1 1 4 5 2 1
Seed 0 1 1 6 3 0
Early 1 3 1 4 2 0
Expansion 4 6 5 6 5 0
Late 1 2 0 1 0 0
Turnaround 0 0 0 0 0 1
Buyout 4 0 6 8 0 0
High-Tech 6 8 7 15 8 1
Medical/Biotech 1 1 3 1 2 0
Electronic/Computer 3 0 0 4 0 1
Communication/Internet 2 7 4 10 6 0
Non-Tech Industries 4 4 6 10 2 0
Average # Rounds 2.5 1.25 1.77 1.48 1 4
Average # Syndicated Partners 1.2 1 1 0.76 1.1 2
Average # Respondent VC Board Seats 2 1.08 1.46 1.44 1.1 1
Average # Syndicated VC Board Seats 1.1 0.75 0.69 0.8 1 2
Average # Total Board Seats 6 5.75 3.92 4.72 4.6 6
Total # Exits 10 12 13 25 10 1
Table 2a.  Summary of the Data by Exit Vehicle
This table presents, by exit vehicle, the number of divestments (actual and expected), the internal rate of retun (IRR) (expected exit as at 9/2001), ownership percentages, control over exit, conflicts 
over exit, type of security, stage of development at first investment, # rounds, # syndicated VCs, and board seats.
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Actual IPOs Expected IPOs Actual Acquisitions Expected Acquisitions Actual Write-offs Expected Write-downs
Financial Contingencies - Entrepreneur 1 3 1 10 0 0
Non-Financial Contingencies - Entrepreneur 0 3 0 8 0 0
Certain Actions Contingencies - Entrepreneur 0 3 0 2 0 0
Sale of Shares Contingencies - Entrepreneur 1 2 0 3 0 0
Financial Contingencies - Respondent VC 0 3 0 8 0 0
Non-Financial Contingencies - Respondent VC 0 3 0 8 0 0
Certain Actions Contingencies - Respondent VC 0 3 0 4 0 0
Sale of Shares Contingencies - Respondent VC 0 5 0 5 0 0
Financial Contingencies - Syndicated VC 0 1 0 4 0 0
Non-Financial Contingencies - Syndicated VC 0 1 0 3 0 0
Certain Actions Contingencies - Syndicated VC 0 1 0 3 0 0
Sale of Shares Contingencies - Syndicate VC 0 0 0 0 0 0
Veto Rights re Asset Sales 8 7 11 20 6 1
Veto Rights re Asset Purchases 8 7 11 19 6 0
Veto Rights re Changes in Control 9 5 11 21 6 0
Veto Rights re Issuance of Equity 8 5 11 18 6 0
Veto Rights re Other 7 7 10 18 6 0
Increase VC % ownership if poor performance 7 2 5 6 3 0
Increase VC board seats if poor performance 7 0 5 0 3 0
Right to replace CEO 8 0 10 10 3 0
Automatic conversion upon IPO 1 1 1 6 0 0
Right of first refusal in sale 8 6 7 22 6 0
Co-sale agreement 9 7 11 20 6 0
Antidillution 7 3 10 20 6 0
Protection rights in new issues 8 5 10 15 6 1
Redemption rights 7 0 9 2 3 0
Information rights 9 8 11 24 6 0
Demand registration rights 1 1 5 9 0 0
Piggyback registration rights 0 0 4 4 0 0
Total # Exits 10 12 13 25 10 1
Table 2b.  Summary of the Data by Exit Vehicle
This table presents, by exit vehicle, the number of divestments (actual and expected), the contractual contingencies (incentives for the entrepreneur, respondent VC, and syndicated VCs), veto rights, 
contingent equity ownership and board seats, and control rights.
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Correlation Coeficient Chi-squared Correlation Coeficient Chi-squared Correlation Coeficient Chi-squared Correlation Coeficient Chi-squared
Contract contingent on financial performance -- VC incentives -0.308 12.505*** 0.369 17.967*** -0.097 1.242 0.242 7.735***
Contract contract on non-financial performance -- VC incentives -0.134 2.376 0.174 3.987** -0.179 0.000 0.299 11.801***
Contract contingent on certain actions being taken -- VC incentives -0.175 4.049** 0.262 9.069*** -0.075 0.742 0.102 1.375
Contract contingent on sale of securities -- VC incentives -0.168 3.732* 0.271 9.663*** 0.048 0.303 -0.065 0.561
Contract contingent on financial performance -- Entrepreneur incentives -0.108 1.536 0.206 5.618** 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.034
Contract contract on non-financial performance -- Entrepreneur incentives 0.003 0.001 0.146 2.811* -0.058 0.452 -0.029 0.107
Contract contingent on certain actions being taken -- Entrepreneur incentives 0.016 0.032 0.075 0.737 -0.078 0.801 0.060 0.480
Contract contingent on sale of securities -- Entrepreneur incentives -0.152 3.057* 0.142 2.667 0.098 1.271 -0.015 0.029
Contract contingent on financial performance (all) -0.258 8.806*** 0.370 18.031*** -0.080 0.843 0.194 4.951**
Contract contract on non-financial performance (all) -0.108 1.535 0.260 8.917*** -0.122 1.951 0.107 1.504
Contract contingent on certain actions being taken (all) -0.070 0.648 0.223 6.582*** -0.124 2.021 0.085 0.946
Contract contingent on sale of securities (all) -0.183 4.440** 0.254 8.539*** 0.087 0.990 -0.071 0.668
VC has veto over asset sales -0.487 31.263*** 0.250 8.250*** 0.230 6.988*** 0.035 0.160
VC has veto over asset purchases -0.422 23.468*** 0.180 4.271** 0.245 7.915*** -0.006 0.005
VC has veto over changes in control -0.412 22.389*** 0.194 4.977** 0.285 10.708*** -0.072 0.680
VC has veto over issuance of equity -0.374 18.471*** 0.176 4.094** 0.232 7.125*** -0.047 0.286
VC has veto over other decisions -0.197 5.121*** -0.026 0.091 0.245 7.915*** -0.110 1.584
VC ownership percentage >50% -0.084 0.927 -0.286 10.779*** 0.163 3.510* 0.128 2.165
VC ownership percentage <50% 0.084 0.927 0.286 10.779*** -0.163 3.510* -0.128 2.165
VC equity ownership percentage increases if bad performance 0.055 0.393 0.129 2.210 0.018 0.042 -0.183 0.000
VC's Board Seats / Total Board Seats >50% -0.045 0.263 -0.044 0.255 -0.038 0.193 0.187 4.592**
VC's Board Seats / Total Board Seats <50% 0.045 0.263 0.044 0.255 0.038 0.193 -0.187 4.592**
VC's board seats increase if bad performance 0.081 0.861 0.117 1.812 -0.038 0.193 -0.150 0.000
VC has right to replace CEO -0.233 7.187*** -0.179 4.233** 0.377 18.731*** -0.127 2.117
VC shares auutomatically convert upon IPO -0.263 0.000 0.142 2.667 0.098 1.271 0.163 3.516*
VC has right of first refusal -0.081 0.859 0.368 17.877*** -0.164 3.568* 0.060 0.470
VC has co-sale agreement -0.246 7.994*** -0.060 0.470 0.290 11.102*** -0.052 0.359
VC has antidilution provision -0.228 6.866*** 0.014 0.027 0.217 6.234** -0.097 1.244
VC has protection rights against new issues -0.378 18.855*** 0.186 4.556** 0.260 8.911*** -0.119 1.882
VC has redemption rights -0.055 0.398 -0.234 7.219*** 0.266 9.373*** -0.209 5.779**
VC has information rights in operating plans and financials -0.406 21.800*** 0.147 2.838* 0.286 10.789*** -0.035 0.158
VC has demand registration rights -0.431 24.561*** 0.142 2.656 0.212 5.916** -0.024 0.076
VC has piggyback registration rights -0.386 19.676*** 0.100 1.320 0.284 10.630*** -0.195 0.000
VC has control over exit -0.128 2.174 -0.175 4.035** 0.334 14.688*** -0.170 3.796*
Other syndicated VC has control over exit 0.290 11.090*** -0.098 1.258 -0.137 2.479 -0.083 0.900
Founder has control over exit -0.101 1.335 0.283 10.597*** -0.265 9.242*** 0.264 9.230***
Respondent is Lead VC -0.097 1.245 -0.227 6.790*** 0.230 6.959*** 0.028 0.107
Syndication 0.329 14.274*** -0.101 1.338 -0.125 2.072 -0.155 3.168*
Seed -0.107 1.508 0.229 6.936*** -0.155 3.153* 0.161 3.437*
Early 0.013 0.022 0.248 8.112*** -0.051 0.342 -0.175 0.000
Expansion 0.210 5.816** -0.076 0.766 -0.223 6.545** 0.181 4.303**
Late 0.067 0.599 -0.094 0.000 0.082 0.883 -0.068 0.000
Turnaround 0.017 0.038 -0.058 0.000 -0.067 0.000 0.159 3.324*
Buyout -0.183 4.407** -0.256 8.674*** 0.374 18.449*** -0.165 3.579*
High-Tech 0.072 0.686 0.232 7.131*** -0.211 5.853** -0.014 0.025
Medical/Biotech 0.143 2.717* -0.035 0.160 0.023 0.069 -0.146 0.000
Electronic/Computer 0.065 0.556 -0.069 0.637 -0.021 0.060 -0.035 0.160
Communication/Internet -0.094 1.161 0.351 16.278*** -0.237 7.399*** 0.135 2.395
Table 3a.  Significance Tests Relating Types of Securities to Contractual Contingencies, Control Rights and Firm Characteristics
Common Equity Convertible Preferred Equity Preferred and Common Equity Debt and/or Preferred and Common
Correlation coefficients between choice of security, specific contractual contingencies, veto rights, ownership rights, board seats, control rights, and firm characteristics.  Chi-squared significance test reported for cross-tabulations.  *, **, *** 
Significant at th 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Correlation Coeficient Chi-squared Correlation Coeficient Chi-squared Correlation Coeficient Chi-squared
Common Equity 0.352 8.783*** -0.289 5.933** -0.163 1.894
Convertible Preferred Equity -0.123 1.073 0.136 1.321 -0.014 0.014
Mixes of Preferred and Common Equity -0.143 1.446 0.165 1.926 0.134 1.270
Mixes of Debt and Common Equity -0.142 1.441 -0.025 0.045 0.143 1.450
Contract contingent on financial performance -- VC incentives -0.034 0.084 0.165 1.930 -0.222 0.000
Contract contract on non-financial performance -- VC incentives -0.034 0.084 0.165 1.930 -0.222 0.000
Contract contingent on certain actions being taken -- VC incentives 0.085 0.512 0.024 0.041 -0.171 0.000
Contract contingent on sale of securities -- VC incentives 0.166 1.968 -0.029 0.058 -0.210 0.000
Contract contingent on financial performance -- Entrepreneur incentives -0.048 0.166 0.206 3.001* 0.070 0.350
Contract contract on non-financial performance -- Entrepreneur incentives -0.034 0.084 0.165 1.930 0.064 0.295
Contract contingent on certain actions being taken -- Entrepreneur incentives 0.173 2.117 -0.075 0.395 -0.142 0.000
Contract contingent on sale of securities -- Entrepreneur incentives 0.125 1.108 -0.021 0.033 -0.157 0.000
Contract contingent on financial performance (all) -0.028 0.056 0.248 4.368** -0.078 0.433
Contract contract on non-financial performance (all) -0.040 0.116 0.219 3.390* -0.064 0.288
Contract contingent on certain actions being taken (all) 0.166 1.968 -0.029 0.058 -0.210 0.000
Contract contingent on sale of securities (all) 0.218 3.379* -0.069 0.340 -0.222 0.000
VC has veto over asset sales -0.100 0.704 0.171 2.075 -0.016 0.017
VC has veto over asset purchases -0.054 0.210 0.170 2.046 -0.059 0.251
VC has veto over changes in control -0.145 1.500 0.266 5.021** -0.077 0.419
VC has veto over issuance of equity -0.122 1.055 0.200 2.832** -0.010 0.008
VC has veto over other decisions -0.057 0.229 0.139 1.379 -0.010 0.008
VC ownership percentage >50% 0.016 0.019 0.155 1.703 -0.020 0.029
VC ownership percentage <50% -0.016 0.019 -0.155 1.703 0.020 0.029
VC ownership percentage increases if bad performance 0.122 1.055 -0.079 0.444 0.158 1.769
VC's Board Seats / Total Board Seats >50% -0.123 1.073 0.206 3.001* -0.014 0.014
VC's Board Seats / Total Board Seats <50% 0.123 1.073 -0.206 3.001* 0.014 0.014
VC's board seats increase if bad performance 0.175 2.187 -0.209 3.116* -0.014 0.014
VC has right to replace CEO -0.099 0.690 0.194 2.680* 0.031 0.070
VC shares auutomatically convert upon IPO -0.072 0.370 0.185 2.438 -0.093 0.620
VC has right of first refusal -0.078 0.431 0.169 2.038 -0.026 0.049
VC has co-sale agreement -0.030 0.062 0.171 2.075 -0.095 0.640
VC has antidilution provision -0.271 5.223 0.318 7.184*** 0.020 0.029
VC has protection rights against new issues -0.060 0.253 0.054 0.204 0.107 0.812
VC has redemption rights 0.033 0.077 -0.015 0.016 -0.109 0.838
VC has information rights in operating plans and financials -0.077 0.416 0.289 5.929** -0.201 2.870*
VC has demand registration rights -0.216 3.301* 0.367 9.586*** 0.051 0.186
VC has piggyback registration rights -0.239 0.000 0.332 0.000 0.252 4.511**
VC has control over exit -0.145 1.500 0.138 1.359 0.079 0.443
Other syndicated VC has control over exit 0.125 1.108 -0.225 3.578* 0.091 0.586
Founder has control over exit 0.077 0.416 0.003 0.001 -0.156 1.724
Respondent is Lead VC 0.160 1.811 0.070 0.347 -0.201 2.870*
Syndication 0.251 4.487** -0.380 10.261*** 0.123 1.073
Seed -0.203 2.918* 0.087 0.535 0.064 0.295
Early 0.050 0.176 -0.069 0.340 -0.031 0.068
Expansion 0.123 1.072 -0.171 2.074 -0.035 0.089
Late 0.233 3.840** -0.140 1.386 -0.126 0.000
Turnaround -0.080 0.000 -0.128 0.000 0.231 0.000
Buyout -0.110 0.866 0.283 5.703** 0.016 0.017
High-Tech 0.004 0.001 -0.122 1.060 -0.036 0.094
Medical/Biotech -0.046 0.151 -0.025 0.045 0.034 0.081
Electronic/Computer 0.050 0.179 -0.025 0.045 -0.075 0.403
Communication/Internet 0.001 0.000 -0.087 0.542 -0.009 0.006
Actual & Expected IPOs Actual & Expected Acquisitions Actual Writeoffs & Expected Writedowns
Table 3b.  Significance Tests Relating Exit Vehicles to Types of Securities to Contractual Contingencies, Control Rights and Firm Characteristics
Correlation coefficients between choice of security, specific contractual contingencies, veto rights, ownership rights, board seats, control rights, and firm characteristics.  Chi-squared significance test 
reported for cross-tabulations.  *, **, *** Significant at th 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Seed 1.000
Early -0.195 1.000
Expansion -0.267 -0.352 1.000
Buyout -0.244 -0.322 -0.442 1.000
Lead Investor 0.016 0.251 -0.126 -0.166 1.000
# Syndicated Partners -0.196 -0.401 0.140 0.328 -0.400 1.000
Ownership% >50% 0.022 -0.352 -0.138 0.415 -0.263 0.327 1.000
VCBoard% >50% 0.142 -0.221 0.007 0.044 -0.170 0.251 0.449 1.000
Book Value -0.164 -0.188 -0.085 0.380 0.196 0.136 0.122 0.036 1.000
Common Equity -0.107 0.013 0.210 -0.183 0.104 -0.097 -0.084 -0.045 0.003 1.000
Convertible Preferred Equity 0.229 0.248 -0.076 -0.256 0.086 -0.227 -0.286 -0.044 -0.123 -0.411 1.000
Mixed Debt and/or Preferred and Common 0.161 -0.175 0.181 -0.165 -0.085 0.028 0.128 0.187 -0.135 -0.300 -0.162 1.000
High-Tech 0.274 0.346 0.019 -0.424 0.164 -0.374 -0.276 -0.059 -0.253 0.072 0.232 -0.014 1.000
Biotech / Medical -0.099 0.205 0.112 -0.175 0.128 -0.146 -0.113 -0.011 -0.072 0.143 -0.035 -0.146 0.352 1.000
Electronics / Computer 0.053 0.102 -0.076 -0.039 0.110 -0.181 -0.076 -0.151 -0.064 0.065 -0.069 -0.035 0.392 -0.199 1.000
Communications / Internet 0.342 0.131 -0.003 -0.298 -0.018 -0.140 -0.151 0.075 -0.169 -0.094 0.351 0.135 0.490 -0.249 -0.278 1.000
Preplanned IPO -0.074 -0.073 0.138 -0.082 0.124 0.107 -0.060 -0.098 0.249 0.145 0.005 -0.053 0.026 -0.092 -0.175 0.259 1.000
Preplanned Acquisition Exit 0.115 -0.096 -0.068 0.094 -0.053 0.146 0.202 0.160 -0.008 -0.181 0.119 -0.011 -0.027 -0.128 -0.115 0.177 -0.201 1.000
Table 4. Correlations Across Explanatory Variables
This table presents correlation coefficients across explanatory variables used in regressions in subsequent tables.  Correlation coefficients that are significant at the 5% level of significance are 
highlighted in bold font.
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Investor Fixed Effects?
Seed -1.2534 -1.1927 2.4459 1.4281 -1.9957 -1.3867 -0.2368 -0.2084
Early -0.9651 -1.1451 4.2387 2.5691** -1.9945 -1.6258 NA NA
Expansion -0.7211 -1.0923 2.7785 1.9928** -2.1944 -2.1816** 2.4139 1.9832**
Book Value -0.00001 -0.3850 0.000004 0.0670 0.00004 1.4555 -0.0006 -2.3414**
Lead Investor 0.4228 0.6581 -4.6260 -3.6680*** -2.3751 -2.1754** -1.7702 -1.8840*
# Syndicated Investors 0.1042 0.3083 -1.2919 -2.2698** -0.3882 -0.8542 -1.6687 -2.0415**
Preplanned IPO 1.1900 1.3296 -0.4261 -0.3311 -1.4170 -1.0929 -2.6401 -1.4366
Preplanned Acquisition -0.7124 -1.0705 -0.3350 -0.3363 -0.4399 -0.5375 -1.4318 -1.0621
Medical / Biotech -1.4120 -1.6206 1.2966 1.0400 1.0536 0.9128 NA NA
Electronics / Computer 0.1543 0.2082 -1.5754 -1.2183 -1.2407 -1.5323 -0.3238 -0.2616
Communications / Internet -1.7885 -2.1578** -2.8698 -1.6315 0.3741 0.3179 -0.4259 -0.3301
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 61 14 101 7 90 12 115 3
Yes 17 40 10 4 14 16 8 6
Predicted Outcomes Predicted Outcomes Predicted Outcomes Predicted Outcomes
Yes
Table 5a.  Determinants of Security Choice
This table presents binomial logit estimates of the determinants of the selected security choice based on entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC fund characteristics, the book value of the investment, whether the VC was lead investor, the number 
of syndicated partners, and the VC's board seats.  *,**,*** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  NA: Not Applicable.  Inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems.
Explanatory Variables
Yes Yes Yes
Binomial Logit Model Dependent Variables
Common Equity Convertible Preferred Equity Mixed Preferred and Common Mixed Debt and/or Preferred and Common
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 2.8608 1.9217* 1.4485 1.2581 -0.0376 -0.0343
Seed -2.9248 -1.9623** 0.6067 0.4374 0.3127 0.3096
Early -2.8634 -1.9903** 0.4887 0.4977 1.4334 1.3999
Expansion -1.4325 -1.1165 1.5712 2.1034** 1.0524 1.6601**
Book Value -0.00002 -0.5168 -0.00002 -0.7950 0.00005 1.0870
Lead Investor 0.2479 0.3457 -1.2327 -1.2636 -0.7969 -0.9177
# Syndicated Investors 0.1017 0.2816 0.1057 0.2865 0.3303 0.7940
Preplanned IPO 0.2915 0.3100 0.8101 0.7390 1.7977 1.4996
Preplanned Acquisition -1.0148 -1.3975 -0.8458 -1.2468 0.0446 0.0652
Medical / Biotech 0.6955 0.7081 -0.3625 -0.4225 1.3947 1.2022
Electronics / Computer 0.8826 0.8817 0.2525 0.2985 0.0380 0.0545
Communications / Internet -0.6443 -0.7484 0.4684 0.4377 -0.4032 -0.4896
Actual Outcomes Common Conv. Preferred Mixed Pref+Com Mixed Debt+Com
Common 42 6 2 7
Convertible Preferred 11 11 1 1
Mixed Pref + Common 8 0 7 8
Mixed Debt + Common 13 3 5 7
Multinomial Logit Model Dependent Variables
Table 5b (part 1).  Determinants of Security Choice
This table presents multinomial logit estimates of the determinants of the selected security choice based on entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC fund 
characteristics, the book value of the investment, whether the VC was lead investor, the number of syndicated partners, and the VC's board seats.  *,**,*** 
Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Loge (PCommon /PConvertiblePreferred)
Explanatory Variables
Loge (PCommon /PMixedPred-Common)  Loge (PCommon /PMixedDebt-Pref-Common)
Predicted Outcomes
Table continues below…
 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant -1.4123 -0.8133 -2.8985 -1.7119 -1.4862 -1.0627
Seed 3.5315 1.9251* 3.2376 2.0613** -0.2940 -0.2019
Early 3.3521 2.1064** 4.2968 2.6613*** 0.9447 0.7766
Expansion 3.0037 2.1689** 2.4849 1.8633* -0.5188 -0.6309
Book Value 0.000002 0.0481 0.0001 1.2214 0.0001 1.4533
Lead Investor -1.4805 -1.3539 -1.0448 -1.0642 0.4357 0.3643
# Syndicated Investors 0.0040 0.0087 0.2286 0.4632 0.2247 0.4767
Preplanned IPO 0.5186 0.3852 1.5061 1.0887 0.9876 0.6619
Preplanned Acquisition 0.1689 0.1990 1.0593 1.3094 0.8904 1.1998
Medical / Biotech -1.0581 -0.8953 0.6992 0.4945 1.7573 1.3715
Electronics / Computer -0.6300 -0.5256 -0.8445 -0.7662 -0.2145 -0.2370
Communications / Internet 1.1127 0.9083 0.2411 0.2405 -0.8716 -0.7556
Table 5b (part 2).  Determinants of Security Choice
This table presents multinomial logit estimates of the determinants of the selected security choice based on entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC fund characteristics, 
the book value of the investment, whether the VC was lead investor, the number of syndicated partners, and the VC's board seats.  *,**,*** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively.
Explanatory Variables
Multinomial Logit Model Dependent Variables
 Loge (PMixedPref-Common /PMixedDebt-Pref-Common)Loge (PConvertible Preferred / PMixedDebt-Pref-Common)Loge (PConvertible Preferred / PMixedPref-Common)
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Investor Fixed Effects?
Seed 2.4778 1.9606** 0.5493 0.4293 -4.0822 -2.6181*** 4.7028 0.6201 17.3182 2.2701**
Early NA NA -1.7704 -1.4711 -3.1694 -2.8776*** -12.7675 -1.7943* -12.5406 -1.7546*
Expansion -2.7493 -2.2415** -2.3957 -2.5580** -0.2107 -0.3602 -14.7713 -2.3589** -13.0191 -2.1839**
Book Value 0.00003 0.9260 0.0001 1.7922* -0.00001 -0.3935 0.00009 0.6581 0.00010 0.6849
Common Equity -1.0697 -1.3790 -0.4749 -0.6511 0.3317 0.6032 0.41640 0.0930 1.18451 0.2459
Convertible Preferred Equity -2.6640 -1.5966 -1.2285 -1.0354 2.3326 2.6367*** -0.59686 -0.1090 1.56817 0.2225
Mixed Debt and Common Equity 1.8049 1.1831 0.6479 0.5733 NA NA 16.48120 2.4759** 17.84120 2.3332**
Lead Investor -0.0069 -0.0082 NA NA -1.2547 -2.7688*** 6.5641 1.3491 NA NA
# Syndicated Investors -1.8534 -3.1261*** 0.4784 1.2956 -0.0209 -0.0658 -8.3636 -3.3595*** 2.9746 1.3812
Preplanned IPO 0.7999 0.5034 -1.3185 -1.0711 0.2923 0.3583 -1.9516 -0.3721 -2.2986 -0.3146
Preplanned Acquisition 2.0370 2.1277** 0.9738 1.2586 0.9612 1.6719* 1.7541 0.4057 7.0797 1.5110
Medical / Biotech -2.0253 -1.4692 -2.4193 -1.9597* 1.1343 1.5810 1.7497 0.3037 0.0668 0.0135
Electronics / Computer -0.6078 -0.7557 -0.9521 -1.1228 -0.3833 -0.5311 2.5344 0.6798 5.7801 1.6278
Communications / Internet -3.5400 -2.4430** -3.5093 -2.8352*** -0.8898 -1.1278 -0.9707 -0.1757 -2.5912 -0.4816
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 78 11 52 13 98 5
Yes 12 31 8 59 21 8
Yes
Binomial Logit Regressions OLS Regressions
Respondent VC % Respondent + Syndicated VCs' %
Table 6.  Determinants of VC Ownership %
This table presents OLS and binomial logit estimates of the determinants of the VC ownership % based on entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC fund characteristics, the book value of the investment, whether the VC was lead 
investor, the number of syndicated partners, and the VC's board seats.  *,**,*** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  NA: Not Applicable; inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems, or the variable 
was not economically meangingful.
Explanatory Variables
Yes Yes Yes
Respondent VC % > 50% VC Equity Incr. if Poor Perform.Respondent + Syndicated VCs' % > 50%
Yes
Predicted Outcomes Predicted Outcomes
Adjusted R2 = Adjusted R2 = 
Predicted Outcomes
0.5676 0.5364
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Investor Fixed Effects?
Seed NA NA -1.9127 -1.4973 NA NA 0.0359 0.9567 -0.0474 -0.6981
Early NA NA -1.2793 -1.2283 0.8605 0.6791 -0.0313 -0.8546 -0.0068 -0.1075
Expansion -1.5515 -1.8077* -2.2410 -2.3778** 2.7027 3.0479*** -0.0069 -0.2428 -0.0147 -0.3613
Book Value -0.0001 -1.8033* 0.00001 0.3600 0.00004 1.3398 -0.000001 -1.0762 0.00000 0.1638
Common Equity -1.4939 -1.7405* 0.8066 1.0695 1.0892 1.3803 -0.03413 -1.5016 -0.00541 -0.1391
Convertible Preferred Equity NA NA -0.8664 -0.8124 3.14442 3.1259*** -0.09024 -2.6476** -0.15353 -2.4492**
Mixed Debt and Common Equity NA NA 0.3052 0.2457 1.1998 1.1465 -0.05627 -1.4788 -0.09295 -1.5829
Lead Investor NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0606 2.0132** NA NA
# Syndicated Investors NA NA 0.6719 1.6487 0.4358 0.9930 0.0237 1.7468* 0.0609 2.8387
Preplanned IPO NA NA -3.2160 -2.4242** -0.3942 -0.3894 -0.0896 -2.9273*** -0.1426 -2.7482***
Preplanned Acquisition -1.6753 -1.8865* -2.0844 -2.1568** -0.5150 -0.6672 0.0010 0.0395 -0.0149 -0.4433
Medical / Biotech -1.6753 -1.8865* -0.4973 -0.4766 1.8556 2.1868** -0.0117 -0.3931 0.0306 0.5940
Electronics / Computer -2.9062 -2.3669** -0.8829 -1.1288 0.7793 0.8017 -0.0330 -1.4640 -0.0156 -0.3700
Communications / Internet -1.9113 -1.8032* -0.3571 -0.3470 0.5658 0.6234 -0.0139 -0.4135 -0.0611 -1.1847
Respondent VC Ownership % 0.0367 3.2127*** NA NA 0.0522 2.9619*** 0.0036 6.7283*** NA NA
Total VC Ownership % NA NA 0.0335 3.0811*** NA NA NA NA 0.0043 4.9879***
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 104 7 58 14 108 3
Yes 9 12 14 46 14 7
Predicted Outcomes Predicted Outcomes
Adjusted R2 = Adjusted R2 = 
Predicted Outcomes
0.64317 0.46583
Table 7.  Determinants of VC Board %
This table presents OLS and binomial logit estimates of the determinants of the VC board % based on entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC fund characteristics, the book value of the investment, whether the 
VC was lead investor, the number of syndicated partners, and the VC's board seats.  *,**,*** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  NA: Not Applicable; inclusion of variable caused perfect 
collinearity problems, or the variable was not economically meangingful.
Explanatory Variables
Yes Yes Yes
Respondent VC % > 50% VC Board Seats Increase if Poor Perform.Resp. + Synd. VCs' % > 50%
Yes Yes
Binomial Logit Regressions OLS Regressions
Respondent VC % spondent + Syndicated VC
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Coeficient t-statistic Coeficient t-statistic Coeficient t-statistic Coeficient t-statistic Coeficient t-statistic Coeficient t-statistic Coeficient t-statistic Coeficient t-statistic
Fixed Effect VC Fund Dummies
Seed -1.3181 -1.0600 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1.7762 0.9692 0.3201 0.1738 NA NA NA NA
Early 0.3798 0.4651 0.4319 0.5559 0.3058 0.4051 NA NA 1.5336 0.8931 -1.9451 -0.9802 -2.3730 -1.1723 -0.2880 -0.2962
Expansion -0.2060 -0.2884 0.1558 0.1867 -0.3617 -0.4714 -1.2119 -1.0534 1.4588 0.7963 -0.4638 -0.2662 -1.7333 -0.9062 -1.1524 -1.2294
Lead Investor NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -3.6570 -2.2949** -3.4084 -2.8569*** -2.9811 -1.8074* 0.0689 0.1076
# Syndicated Investors 0.1210 0.3805 -0.1260 -0.3292 -0.1713 -0.4354 -0.8542 -1.2395 -2.1949 -2.3444** -1.6069 -1.9191* -1.0999 -1.1815 -0.9716 -1.9144*
VC Owner % >50% -0.9423 -1.6162 -2.3330 -2.7081*** -1.3033 -1.9563* -0.9273 -1.1676 1.0284 0.8449 -2.8225 -1.6624* -0.8501 -0.4868 -1.3910 -1.6433
Book Value 0.0001 1.5303 -0.0002 -1.8555* -0.0001 -1.7630* -0.0001 -1.2335 -0.0001 -0.9304 -0.0001 -0.5607 -0.0006 -1.0988 -0.00002 -0.7187
Common Equity -0.9172 -1.4281 -0.7697 -1.0116 -0.5932 -0.8241 -4.3338 -2.2280** -3.6972 -1.6529* -1.0217 -0.5649 -6.4843 -1.8872* -1.7911 -1.8658*
Convertible Preferred Equity 2.0970 1.7860* -0.7206 -0.7516 -1.1408 -1.1268 NA NA 3.1596 1.9794** -1.6506 -0.7802 -3.7396 -0.9970 2.6864 2.9040***
Mixed Debt and Common 0.5073 0.5432 -0.4088 -0.3704 -1.3021 -0.9475 NA NA 1.9294 0.9982 1.9898 1.0829 -3.0522 -0.8237 NA NA
Biotech / Medical -0.4758 -0.6203 1.6033 1.7087* 1.4239 1.6266 -2.0079 -1.5589 -1.3864 -0.9888 1.3116 0.7352 1.2290 0.5392 -0.2897 -0.2644
Computer / Electronics -1.4802 -1.8221* -0.3820 -0.4423 -1.0678 -1.1659 -30.1400 -0.00003 -0.7363 -0.6070 0.7249 0.4326 NA NA -2.0828 -1.6558*
Communication / Internet -1.4071 -1.5017 0.0999 0.1098 0.8116 0.8511 -4.8427 -2.8322*** -2.5193 -1.5243 -0.4714 -0.3127 1.0043 0.4046 -1.6455 -1.4388
Preplanned IPO -1.4614 -1.4017 -0.5114 -0.4987 0.4550 0.4840 4.0103 2.0099** 0.5079 0.3559 3.9198 2.3332** 8.5758 2.1290** 3.2821 2.3514**
Preplanned Acquisition -0.2090 -0.3039 -0.3540 -0.4285 -1.0413 -1.1201 0.6505 0.5626 0.2603 0.2780 3.6202 2.5493** 5.2542 1.5778 -1.0465 -0.9735
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 89 8 101 8 108 4 120 1 101 9 115 4 121 2 110 4
Yes 19 16 13 10 14 6 6 5 9 13 4 9 2 7 11 7
This table presents regressions for the determinants of contingencies in venture capital contracts that directly affect either the entrepreneur or the venture capitalist.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  NA: Not 
Applicable; inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems.
Dependent Variables
Yes Yes Yes
Explanatory Variables
Venture Capitalist's Contingencies (Incentives):
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted Outcomes Predicted Outcomes
Table 8.  Determinants of Contingencies (Contractual Incentives Not Directly Part of the Security; see Appendix A)
Financial Performance Non-Financial Performance Certain Actions Sale of Equity Financial Performance Non-Financial Performance Certain Actions Sale of Equity
Entrepreneurs' Contingencies (Incentives):
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
VC Fund Fixed Effects Dummies?
Seed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.7236 2.1415**
Early -1.4519 -1.5649 -2.0208 -2.4372** 0.0065 0.0080 -0.5983 -0.7661 2.0843 1.8447*
Expansion -0.8521 -1.0999 -0.9039 -1.2284 -0.9968 -1.4299 -0.8390 -1.1713 -0.6916 -0.9379
# Syndicated Investors 0.4360 0.9739 0.2776 0.7142 0.0047 0.0135 -0.0250 -0.0730 -0.0151 -0.0403
Lead VC 2.7342 3.8964*** 2.3116 3.8304*** 1.4707 2.9587*** 0.9842 2.1464** 1.8776 3.3563***
VC Board >50% 1.2051 1.7610* 0.8036 1.3208 0.4304 0.7640 0.7148 1.2516 -0.0890 -0.1528
Book Value -0.00004 -1.3195 -0.00002 -0.7164 0.00000 0.1415 0.00000 0.0986 -0.0001 -2.5037**
Common Equity -2.9845 -3.3445*** -2.2749 -2.9325*** -1.1585 -1.7069* -1.3267 -1.9406* -0.8744 -1.2636
Convertible Preferred Equity 2.3312 1.9205* 1.7826 1.6993* 2.0764 1.6491 2.5212 1.8966* -2.7755 -2.5806**
Debt and Common -1.3250 -1.1301 -1.0170 -0.9740 0.1209 0.1176 0.5253 0.4902 -3.1940 -2.4343**
Biotech / Medical -0.8132 -0.9196 0.0808 0.0956 1.7816 2.0475** 2.6244 2.6184*** 2.0095 2.2129**
Computer / Electronic 1.7764 1.9577* 1.5232 1.8861* 1.7260 2.1512** 2.1988 2.5968*** 1.7321 2.0509**
Communications / Internet -0.9829 -0.9354 -0.2429 -0.2509 0.5550 0.6247 0.8772 0.9820 -1.6131 -1.6486
Preplanned IPO 0.8854 0.8363 0.2737 0.2930 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.1557 -0.1872 1.5451 1.6041
Preplanned Acquisition 1.4511 1.5025 1.1798 1.3632 1.3437 1.5280 1.0194 1.2934 2.5296 2.8557***
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 31 13 31 15 20 15 26 13 32 14
Yes 9 79 9 77 9 88 8 85 12 74
Yes
Predicted Outcomes
Asset Purchases
Yes Yes Yes
Table 9.  Determinants of Veto Rights
Dependent Variables: Veto Rights
This table presents the determinants of veto rights, as a function of entrepreneurial firm characteristics and the structure of the contract.  *, **, *** Significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  NA: Not Applicable; inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems (all seed investments involved all of these veto 
rights).
Explanatory Variables
Asset Sales OtherIssuances of EquityChanges in Control
Yes
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
VC Fund Fixed Effects Dummies?
Seed -1.4088 -1.0572 NA NA -1.2391 -1.0805 0.5820 0.5278 1.7293 1.3436
Early -35.6262 -0.00002 -2.4794 -2.0477** -2.3249 -2.3616** -0.9357 -1.0125 -1.1243 -1.2276
Expansion -1.5823 -1.7803* -3.2323 -3.0773*** 0.7777 1.0814 -0.4498 -0.5944 -0.6809 -0.8201
# Syndicated Investors 0.6660 1.2789 NA NA -0.4660 -1.2098 0.2939 0.8345 0.4677 1.1963
Lead Investor 1.7628 2.7006*** -0.8860 -1.9103* -1.4431 -2.9015*** 2.4010 3.7591*** 2.4972 3.8687***
VC Board > 50% 2.7705 2.7147*** -2.2031 -2.4594** 2.3422 3.8745*** 0.8490 1.4674 0.1024 0.1691
Book Value 0.00001 0.2096 -0.00004 -1.3529 0.00003 1.0915 0.00004 0.9493 -0.0001 -1.8790*
Common Equity -4.0322 -3.0648*** NA NA 0.1505 0.2292 -2.2676 -2.7693*** -2.0771 -2.5478**
Convertible Preferred Equity -3.0086 -2.1365** NA NA 3.4173 2.9784*** -2.8961 -2.5704** -2.3090 -2.1204**
Mixed Debt and Common -3.9444 -2.7411*** NA NA -0.3566 -0.3739 -2.8631 -2.5367** -3.4907 -2.6722***
Biotech / Medical 3.0689 2.3639** NA NA -0.8543 -1.1123 -1.3159 -1.5422 0.8202 0.9579
Computer / Electronics -0.5499 -0.5847 NA NA -0.8453 -1.1604 0.8078 1.0484 1.8571 2.2498**
Communications / Internet -3.4545 -2.4577** NA NA -0.9059 -1.0418 -2.4904 -2.1865** -1.8033 -1.5926
Preplanned IPO 1.2741 0.8823 0.8615 0.7288 -0.2845 -0.3044 0.2672 0.2562 0.9645 1.0075
Preplanned Acquisition 3.2065 2.4947** -0.3056 -0.3703 1.3473 1.9229* 2.4006 2.3497** 4.0928 3.2566***
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 71 9 116 5 54 14 33 14 44 13
Yes 10 42 5 6 11 53 12 73 7 68
Yes
Anti-Dilution
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Co-Sale Agreement
Dependent Variables: Control Rights
Explanatory Variables
Replace CEO Automatic Convert IPO First Refusal in Sale
Table 10 (part 1).  Determinants of Control Rights (see Appendix B)
This table presents the determinants of VC control rights by type of right, depending on the characteristics of the entrepreneurial.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  NA: Not Applicable; inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems.
Predicted Outcomes
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
VC Fund Fixed Effects Dummies?
Seed -2.4182 -1.7422* -2.4096 -1.9030* -0.0374 -0.0292 -2.9199 -2.0980** NA NA
Early -1.4674 -1.4964 -1.5402 -1.7767* -0.6581 -0.6331 -3.1071 -2.4616** -1.2207 -1.2800
Expansion -0.7197 -0.9274 -0.7504 -1.1098 0.3341 0.3792 -2.9800 -2.8455*** -3.5227 -2.9016***
# Syndicated Investors -0.5198 -1.3458 -0.3762 -1.0076 -0.3046 -0.7274 -0.2936 -0.6816 -1.1671 -2.3252***
Lead Investor 2.8085 4.0821*** 1.8141 3.5701*** 3.4346 3.7701*** 1.2482 2.3221** 1.6856 2.7813***
VC Board > 50% 0.9793 1.5626 0.5753 1.0669 0.8288 1.1900 0.1242 0.1794 0.0526 0.0740
Book Value -0.0001 -1.7608* -0.0001 -1.9085* 0.00002 0.4395 0.00004 1.1232 0.00001 0.3022
Common Equity -2.6887 -3.5483*** -1.5286 -2.5364** -3.7118 -3.1920*** -2.0144 -2.5290** -2.5746 -2.8001***
Convertible Preferred Equity 0.5595 0.5177 -1.8336 -1.8942* 0.5089 0.3777 3.5564 3.0199*** 3.7509 3.1273***
Mixed Debt and Common -3.7202 -3.2862*** -3.6241 -2.9220*** -3.2054 -2.3920** 0.8631 0.7008 NA NA
Biotech / Medical 0.7997 0.9117 1.2292 1.5755 -0.5163 -0.5580 NA NA -1.4872 -1.1949
Computer / Electronics 2.8754 3.0753*** 1.7070 2.1918** 2.0571 1.9901** -0.3856 -0.4903 -0.9999 -1.2315
Communications / Internet -1.8383 -1.8288* -0.3901 -0.4363 -0.9053 -0.7905 -2.6918 -2.1995** -6.2615 -3.6052***
Preplanned IPO 1.6417 1.5880 -0.0853 -0.0929 0.8665 0.8037 -1.2069 -0.9016 NA NA
Preplanned Acquisition 1.5045 1.7551* -0.2928 -0.4606 3.1307 2.1319** -0.1790 -0.2303 -0.0934 -0.1137
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 42 11 73 11 31 10 83 7 94 6
Yes 11 68 12 36 5 86 9 33 8 24
Yes Yes YesYes Yes
Redemption Rights
Explanatory Variables
Information Rights
Dependent Variables: Control Rights
Demand Reg. Rights Piggyback Reg. RightsProtection Re New Issues
Table 10 (part 2).  Determinants of Control Rights (see Appendix B)
This table presents the determinants of VC control rights by type of right, depending on the characteristics of the entrepreneurial.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  NA: Not Applicable; inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems.
Predicted Outcomes
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant NA NA NA NA NA NA -2.5698 -1.1867 -13.7273 -2.5980*** -11.1575 -2.1085**
Actual Exit Fixed Effect Dummy -11.4204 -2.8731*** -1.0634 -0.4590 3.7302 1.7342* NA NA NA NA NA NA
Expected Exit Fixed Effect Dummy -16.9251 -3.1318*** 3.2803 1.3781 2.8175 1.2394 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Common Equity 5.4714 2.7508*** -1.9620 -2.1279** -1.4190 -1.3666 1.9500 2.2998** 2.0083 1.1257 0.0583 0.0355
Convertible Preferred Equity -4.0235 -1.4538 2.1753 1.2850 1.2988 1.0180 0.0160 0.0143 -0.2876 -0.1285 -0.3035 -0.1468
Mixed Debt Common -2.0351 -0.7883 0.8918 0.5287 2.0693 1.5287 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Market/Book -0.1160 -0.9821 0.2491 1.8097* NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Investment Months 0.0567 1.2161 -0.0289 -0.9393 -0.0437 -1.4063 0.0386 1.2923 0.3172 2.4643** 0.2786 2.1923**
Biotech / Medical -1.9163 -1.1852 -0.3213 -0.2833 -0.2606 -0.2272 -0.7552 -0.6394 -1.6825 -0.7265 -0.9273 -0.4389
Computer / Electronics -2.3708 -1.2530 -0.5583 -0.4263 -0.9111 -0.5965 -0.8145 -0.7500 -6.2964 -1.8192* -5.4819 -1.6214
Communication / Internet 2.5952 1.2931 -1.4732 -1.3906 -1.4829 -1.3761 0.3639 0.3809 -1.0246 -0.5295 -1.3885 -0.7302
Preplanned Exit 2.6837 1.6143 1.3587 1.1694 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Market Conditions 3.7623 1.9240* 1.2686 1.0078 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Fundraising 4.0514 1.3997 -1.3467 -0.6136 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
VC Control Exit 1.6307 0.8647 -0.6500 -0.3917 -2.6024 -1.5047 -0.6822 -0.4510 3.1364 1.0198 3.8186 1.1972
Entrepreneur Control Exit 4.8802 1.9273* -0.6074 -0.3371 -5.4039 -2.2395** 0.7283 0.4453 8.5230 2.3120** 7.7947 2.0794**
VC Board Seats > 50% -1.5114 -0.9165 -0.1928 -0.2121 0.9300 1.1042 -0.1305 -0.1662 -2.5373 -1.2599 -2.4069 -1.2099
Number VC Syndicated Partners 1.2450 1.8050* -0.3105 -0.6750 0.1009 0.2200 0.5432 1.2845 0.3429 0.4740 -0.2003 -0.2825
Total # Contingencies 3.7557 2.5840*** -1.3833 -2.0540** NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total # Veto Rights -1.1096 -1.3967 -0.0777 -0.1726 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total # Control Rights 0.6043 1.2165 0.3429 1.1320 -0.1411 -0.4974 -0.0605 -0.2307 1.0179 1.5159 1.0784 1.6529*
Expected Exit NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.6711 -0.9177 3.4547 1.4057 4.1257 1.6962*
Actual Outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes IPO Acquisition Write-off
No 44 5 24 9 52 4 IPO 11 11 0
Yes 7 15 9 29 10 5 Acquisition 5 32 1
Write-off 0 2 9
Table 11.  Determinants of Exit Vehicle
Multinomial Logit Model Dependent Variables
This table presents the determinants of the choice of exit vehicle: IPO, acquisition (trade sale), and write-off.  Actual and expected exits are included.  Fixed effects regressions are used to control for 
differences between actual and expected exits.  *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  NA: Not Applicable; inclusion of variable caused perfect collinearity problems.
Explanatory Variables
Binomial Logit Model Dependent Variables
IPO Loge (PAcquisition / PWrite-off)
Predicted Outcomes
Loge (PIPO / PWrite-off)Loge (PIPO / PAcquisition )Write-offAcquisition
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Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 1.0015 262.7240*** 0.0013 0.3565 1.0070 164.2510*** 0.0067 1.1269
IPO 0.0198 4.9524*** 0.0197 5.0458*** 0.0330 7.3483*** 0.0326 7.5138***
Acquisition 0.0215 6.6984*** 0.0213 6.7930*** 0.0302 16.4670*** 0.0300 16.8941***
Book Value -7.4402E-08 -1.3169 -7.4011E-08 -1.3430 -1.6191E-07 -2.5006** -0.0000002 -2.4718**
# Rounds 0.0022 1.8319* 0.0022 1.8684* 0.0019 1.4261 0.0019 1.4714
Seed -0.0096 -2.9291*** -0.0094 -2.9432*** -0.0171 -4.4577*** -0.0167 -4.5056***
Early Stage -0.0108 -2.9772*** -0.0106 -2.9879*** -0.0166 -4.4580*** -0.0161 -4.4963***
Expansion Stage -0.0043 -1.8936* -0.0043 -1.9170* 0.0021 0.9178 0.0020 0.9084
Biotech / Medical 0.0039 1.4925 0.0038 1.4903 0.0083 3.1960*** 0.0081 3.2169***
Computer / Electronic 0.0030 0.9724 0.0029 0.9390 0.0041 1.0290 0.0040 1.0449
Communications / Internet 0.0045 1.7881* 0.0044 1.7793 0.0133 3.8544*** 0.0129 3.8814***
Investment Months 0.0000 -0.1821 0.0000 -0.2136 -0.0001 -2.5085** -0.0001 -2.5196***
Common Equity -0.0003 -0.1716 -0.0004 -0.1844 0.0001 0.0500 0.0001 0.0460
Convertible Preferred Equity 0.0038 1.6333 0.0037 1.6311 -0.0185 -5.5508*** -0.0181 -5.6266***
Mixed Debt and Common -0.0035 -1.5142 -0.0035 -1.5124 -0.0247 -7.1725*** -0.0240 -7.2839***
Ownership % 0.0001 1.1830 0.0001 1.1715 0.0001 1.9402* 0.0001 1.9028*
VC Board Seats > 50% 0.0016 0.8534 0.0015 0.8441 -0.0023 -1.0660 -0.0021 -1.0201
Market Conditions reason for exit -0.0087 -3.2586*** -0.0086 -3.2745*** -0.0083 -2.9445*** -0.0082 -2.9911***
Preplanned Exit -0.0011 -0.3293 -0.0011 -0.3491 -0.0067 -2.3780** -0.0066 -2.4371**
Total Number of Contingent Contractual Clauses 0.0009 0.9627 0.0009 0.9677 -0.0030 -0.7789 -0.0032 -0.8648
Total Number of Veto Right Clauses 0.0006 0.6567 0.0006 0.6560 0.0145 5.7843*** 0.0141 5.8277***
Total Number of Control Right Clauses -0.0024 -3.6880*** -0.0023 -3.7128*** -0.0103 -6.9231*** -0.0101 -7.0098***
Expected Exit -0.0143 -3.7886*** -0.0141 -3.8172*** NA NA NA NA
Adjusted R2
Table 12.  Determinants of Returns
0.5252 0.5294 0.8562 0.8610
Actual and Expected Exits (71 Observations) Actual Exits only (33 Observations)
This table presents the determinants of returns: [1+IRR] and [Log(1+IRR)].  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variables
Model 1: 1+IRR Model 2: Log(1+IRR) Model 3: 1+IRR Model 4: Log(1+IRR)
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
 
1 The term ‘venture capital’ is defined differently across countries.  In this paper we employ the 
definition used by the European Venture Capital Association (www.evca.com), which is inclusive 
of seed, early, expansion, mezzanine (late), turnaround and buyout transactions.  This broad 
definition is also used in other jurisdictions such as Canada (www.cvca.ca).  Regardless, the main 
results in this paper are not contingent on the particular definition of venture capital.  As well, all 
of the (self-described) venture capital funds in the data herein consider financing different types 
of entrepreneurial firms. 
 
2 Venture capitalists may also dispose of their investments via a secondary sale (where the 
venture capitalist sells to a third party, but the entrepreneur retains his or her interest), a buyback 
(where the entrepreneur repurchases the venture capitalist’s interest), or a write-off (liquidation); 
see MacIntosh (1997).  Partial dispositions through each exit vehicle are also possible (Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2002). 
 
3 The term ‘acquisition’ generally refers to trade sales to other investors as well as other strategic 
acquirors.  Acquisitions pertain to strategic acquirors in the data herein. 
 
4 Schweinbacher (2002) considers VC exits in Europe, but the data are averaged at the VC fund 
level (no investment specific data were collected). 
 
5 This list omits papers pertaining to VC fundraising and fund structure (see, e.g., Jeng and Wells, 
2000; Gompers and Lerner, 1996, 1998, 1999; and Mayer et al., 2002).  Please advise the author 
as to missing citations. 
 
6 U.S. based research on this issue has only considered limited partnerships.  Future research in 
the U.S. could consider other types of venture capital funds as well.  In addition, future theoretical 
research may attempt to explain forms of finance other than convertible preferred equity, in light 
of the fact that the only evidence that convertible preferred equity is used most frequently is from 
U.S. data.  Some recent theoretical papers provide guidance as to the use of different securities by 
venture capitalists; see Garmaise (2000), Chemmanur and Chen (2002) and Schindele (2002).  
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7 Gilson and Schizer (2002) note that failed start-ups typically “owe back-rent for office space, 
payroll, and other liabilities” (page 11).  They also note that failed start-ups typically do not file 
for bankruptcy, a proceeding that is worthwhile only when there are remaining assets to be 
divided up (Gilson and Schizer, 2002, footnote 21). 
 
8 See Cumming (2000) for evidence from Canada, Songtao (2000) for evidence from Taiwan, 
Smith and Parahangus (2000) for evidence from Finland, Bascha and Walz (2001) for evidence 
from Germany, as well as the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  As well, note that U.S. VCs 
finance Canadian entrepreneurial firms with a variety of forms of finance (Cumming, 2001).  
Unfortunately, direct tests of functional equivalence are not possible with any of these datasets.  
For example, with a sample of Canadian venture capitalist data, Cumming (2000) provides tests 
of functional equivalence be grouping various securities together and considering whether groups 
of securities are used with the same intensity for similar transaction types.  Cumming, however, 
cannot directly test for functional equivalence across securities with the underlying transactional 
terms. 
 
9 This supports recent theoretical research indicating riskier claims are associated with less 
control.  In Cestone’s model, the intuition is based on the idea that formal control with common 
equity would turn into excessive real control (over interference) because VCs have greater 
incentives to intervene with riskier claims (Cestone, 2000, p.15).  Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002, 
similarly find that different control rights are complementary, not substitutes, in the U.S. where 
convertible preferred equity is typically the selected security. 
 
10 A dummy for non-tech industries was suppressed to avoid collinearity.   These three industry 
categories were most appropriate for the given observations in the data, and the characteristics of 
the investments within each of these three groups were most similar. 
 
11 To the extent that data were available, voting % was nearly perfectly correlated with ownership 
%; therefore, separate tests are not provided. 
 
12 The dependent variables for models 4 and 5 are bounded (between 0 and 1).  Alternative 
econometric specifications did not materially affect the results. 
 
 47 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Trilateral bargaining describes an agency where the entrepreneur has an incentive to give up 
control over the firm to an outside investor (after contracting with the initial investor) in order to 
lower the firm’s cost of capital; see Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Berglöf (1994). 
 
14 ‘Expected exits’ (typically close to the exit date) are not the same thing as ‘preplanned exits’ (at 
time of contract). 
 
15 See also Table 3.b.  These results are not affected by correlation among variables.  For 
example, dropping the variables for control rights, veto rights and contractual contingencies does 
not affect the significance of other variables. 
 
16 The relation between investment duration, market/book ratios and the likelihood of different 
exit outcomes was first studied by MacIntosh (1997), and follow-up work by Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2002, 2003).  MacIntosh (1997) and Cumming and MacIntosh (2002, 2003) find 
firms with higher market/book ratios are more likely to go public. 
 
17 See also Smith and Smith (2000).  Published research by MacIntosh (1997) and Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2002) indicates selection effects associated with a more complete set of exit vehicles 
(IPOs, acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks, and write-offs, as well as the extent of exit (full or 
partial).  Cumming and MacIntosh (2002, 2003) provide extensions to MacIntosh’s (1997) 
seminal paper. 
 
18 Returns may also depend on the characteristics of the investor.  With the actual number of exits 
(33), we do not have a large number of degrees of freedom to use investor fixed effect dummies 
to test this proposition jointly with the other variables.  Nevertheless, with different regressions 
(not presented), investor fixed effects did not appear to be a significant factor in explaining IRRs 
in this data sample.  Other model specifications (e.g., different transformations of the variables 
using Box-Cox methods, etc.) did not materially change the results. 
 
19 These categories are based on Kaplan and Stromberg (2002). 
 
20 These examples are based on Sahlman et al. (1999).  The venture capitalists participating in 
this study did not want any of their actual contracts to appear in public print. 
